Nothing in the repo pushes to, authenticates against, or is gated by Uptime
Kuma any more.
── The sixth instance of the banner bug ────────────────────────────────────
memos had `Restart memos` guarded by `uptime_kuma_enabled`, because the
deprecation banner was placed immediately above it and swept it in. It is a
HANDLER, so every memos config change since 2026-09-11 applied to disk and
silently never restarted the service. Ungated.
That is the same failure found in forgejo-runner's self-assert, phoenixd's timer
enable, mempool's three timer enables, fulcrum's restart handler and bitcoind's
restart handler. Every guard was read and asked "monitoring or deployment?"
before being deleted, which is the only reason this was caught.
── What was removed ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
30 uptime_kuma_enabled guards across 7 unconverted service playbooks, and
the 29 Kuma monitor-creation tasks they gated (embedded Python that drove
the Kuma API, temp credential files, cleanup)
7 dead uptime_kuma_api_url definitions
7 stale DEPRECATED banners
uptime_kuma_enabled and subdomains.uptime_kuma from group_vars/all
healthcheck_push_urls from the vault - 30 push tokens
services/ntfy/setup_ntfy_uptime_kuma_notification.yml -> archive/
The explanatory comments in the six converted roles are KEPT on purpose. They
record why a handler is ungated, and deleting the explanation invites someone
to helpfully re-add the guard.
── The probes moved rather than died ───────────────────────────────────────
Eight per-service health checks were still pushing to Kuma. They are not
superseded by infra/401: that answers "is the unit running", these answer "does
the service actually respond" - an RPC call to bitcoind, a TCP connect to
Fulcrum's Electrum port, an HTTP fetch from Mempool's backend. A process can be
perfectly `active` and useless.
So they were repointed, not deleted. Gatus external endpoints take a POST with
a bearer token and success=true|false where Kuma took a GET with ?status=up, so
report() now maps up/down to true/false internally and no call site changed.
Registered by infra/403 as the `probe` group, one token per host.
Two bugs fixed while in there:
* forgejo-runner's check only ever reported SUCCESS - it exited before pushing
when the runner was down, so a failure was invisible until the heartbeat
window expired. Reporting the failure is the entire point of a check.
* All six healthcheck .service units were mode 0644 and now carry a bearer
token. They are 0600.
Verified: 91 endpoints, 91 UP, 0 DOWN. Every probe triggered by hand and
confirmed arriving. Zero Kuma URLs left in the vault, zero live references in
any playbook or role.
Still standing, deliberately: the Kuma container on watchtower, its Caddy vhost,
and the uptime.contrapeso.xyz DNS record. Turning the service off is a separate
decision from removing the code that talked to it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| deploy_uptime_kuma_playbook.yml | ||
| monitors.json | ||
| MONITORS.md | ||
| README.md | ||
| setup_backup_uptime_kuma_to_lapy.yml | ||
| setup_ntfy_uptime_kuma_notification.yml | ||
| uptime_kuma_vars.yml | ||
Uptime Kuma — archived
Uptime Kuma was the monitoring stack for this infrastructure until 2026-09-11, when it was decommissioned. Everything that referenced it has been removed from the live playbooks; this folder is the record of what it was, kept so the setup can be understood later without digging through git history.
Contents
| File | What it is |
|---|---|
MONITORS.md |
Every monitor that existed, grouped as it was in the UI. The authoritative record. |
monitors.json |
The same data, machine-readable, as returned by the API. |
deploy_uptime_kuma_playbook.yml |
How the server itself was deployed (Docker Compose on monitoring, behind Caddy). |
uptime_kuma_vars.yml |
Variables the deploy playbook needed — it is unreadable without these. |
setup_backup_uptime_kuma_to_lapy.yml |
How its data was backed up, and to where. Useful when disposing of the old volumes. |
Why the inventory was captured from the live server, not the repo
The playbooks only ever created 17 monitors. The live instance had 75. The
difference was created by hand in the UI and existed nowhere else — so a repo-derived
list would have silently lost two thirds of the picture. MONITORS.md is a snapshot of
the real thing, taken immediately before removal.
Push tokens are deliberately excluded. They are live credentials — anything holding one can report a false "up" — and they become meaningless once the server is gone.
What removal did NOT do
Removing the playbook code does not touch the machines. 48 push monitors were driven by scripts and systemd timers installed on the hosts, which keep firing on their schedule and curling an endpoint that no longer answers. They are harmless but they are still there, writing logs and failing quietly.
Left behind, per host:
/opt/disk-monitoring+disk-usage-monitor.{service,timer}— on all 12managedhosts/opt/system-healthcheck+system-healthcheck.{service,timer}— on all 12managedhosts/opt/nodito-monitoring+nodito-cpu-temp-monitor.{service,timer}—nodito/opt/zfs-monitoring—nodito/opt/ups-monitoring—noditobitcoin-knots-healthcheck.{service,timer}—bitcoindatum-gateway-healthcheck.{service,timer}—bitcoinfulcrum-healthcheck.{service,timer}—electrummempool-{backend,frontend,mariadb}-healthcheck.service—mempool- phoenixd and forgejo-runner healthcheck units —
edge,ci_runner
Note nut-monitor.service on nodito is NUT's own daemon, not a monitoring
leftover — do not remove it with the rest.
Cleaning these up is a separate decommissioning pass and was not part of the removal.