personal_infra/ansible/roles
counterweight c3a7ca0ba7
jar-lid-archive: a staging deployment on its own box
Jar Lid Archive (Django + Postgres 18 + SeaweedFS) on jar-lid-archive-staging-box
(nodito VM 3300, 1 core / 1 GB / 10 GB), public at jars-staging.contrapeso.xyz
through vipy's Caddy. New role roles/jar_lid_archive; per-host values in
host_vars, so a production host is a new [jar_lid_archive] entry, not a new
playbook.

── Containers, following :master ──────────────────────────────────────────
The same three services as the app repo's compose.yaml, so staging rehearses
what dev and CI run. Every playbook run pulls :master and `up -d --wait`s;
compose recreates web only when the digest moved. --wait gates on web's
/health/, which checks the database and the bucket, so a green run means the
app serves. Upgrading is re-running the playbook.

── web is on the host network ─────────────────────────────────────────────
Docker's published ports are DNATed before UFW sees them, so `8000:8000` would
answer on the LAN whatever UFW says, and binding to the tailnet IP races
tailscaled at boot. On the host network gunicorn's port is an ordinary one: UFW
default-deny covers the LAN, tailscaled's ts-input accepts tailscale0 ahead of
UFW (checked on mempool-box), and the headscale ACL grants tag:prd-vipy exactly
:8000. db and storage publish on 127.0.0.1 only. Verified: LAN times out, vipy
gets 200.

That matters for HTTPS: the app trusts X-Forwarded-Proto
(DJANGO_BEHIND_TLS_PROXY=1), which is only safe while Caddy is the sole client.
Login POST through the public URL passes CSRF; cookies are Secure.

── Secrets ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Generated straight into host_vars/jar_lid_staging_local/vault.yml, never
printed: Django key, Postgres and S3 secrets, and seed passwords for the
fixture's alice/bob/admin usernames - never the fixture's published passwords,
since the site is public. The group vault gains one line, this host's Gatus push
token; decrypted, it differs from before by exactly that line.

── Backups, and the outage the first one caused ───────────────────────────
One uncompressed tar (pg_dump -Fc + the SeaweedFS data dir), age-encrypted on
the box at 02:20, pulled by small-backups-box; 3 days at both ends. Verified end
to end, including decrypting a pulled artefact on lapy.

The first test run stopped web AND storage and left the app down 26 minutes:
SeaweedFS outlasted its 150s healthcheck budget on this disk, compose marked it
unhealthy, and web's depends_on never started it. Now only web is stopped - it
is the only writer to both stores, so they are still captured at one instant -
and the healthchecks have start_periods sized for the disk.

Also inherited from the app's compose.yaml: storage writes /tmp/s3.json and
chowns it to seaweed, so on a RESTART of the same container root cannot
re-create it (sticky /tmp + protected_regular): "Permission denied". Fixed here
with rm -f first; the app repo needs the same line.

── The disk is the problem ────────────────────────────────────────────────
The VM disk is on proxmox-tank-1, the HDD mirror, which knots-box's random reads
(~6 MB/s) keep near saturation. Inside this VM: ~96% "full" I/O pressure while
idle, ~5 min to start web, sudo occasionally over 12s. Moving it to local-zfs
(NVMe) is the fix; noted in the README, not done.

── Also ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- lan_ip read from the Proxmox guest agent; host key checked against the one
  the agent reads off the disk before it went into known_hosts.
- Monitoring: liveness + disk (400), probe_jar-lid-archive-staging (403), public
  /health/ + DNS (402), backup-dump/backup-store.
- tofu: the VM definition.
- Deployed v2026.10.03.1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 23:56:30 +02:00
..
backup_source backups: monitor both the dump and the pull, per source 2026-09-14 09:22:12 +02:00
backup_store disk check: it never worked. Fix it, and the false DOWNs it hid behind 2026-09-15 20:42:59 +02:00
bitcoin_knots uptime kuma: remove every live reference, repoint the probes to Gatus 2026-09-14 10:30:28 +02:00
caddy_site ansible: delete the duplicated vars files, move globals to group_vars/all 2026-09-13 20:58:46 +02:00
datum_gateway uptime kuma: remove every live reference, repoint the probes to Gatus 2026-09-14 10:30:28 +02:00
forgejo_runner forgejo-runner: give CI jobs a Docker daemon of their own 2026-09-27 22:32:08 +02:00
fulcrum uptime kuma: remove every live reference, repoint the probes to Gatus 2026-09-14 10:30:28 +02:00
gatus gatus: show resolved values on successful conditions, ui as a pass-through 2026-09-14 22:14:44 +02:00
gatus_endpoint gatus: show resolved values on successful conditions, ui as a pass-through 2026-09-14 22:14:44 +02:00
healthcheck disk check: it never worked. Fix it, and the false DOWNs it hid behind 2026-09-15 20:42:59 +02:00
jar_lid_archive jar-lid-archive: a staging deployment on its own box 2026-10-03 23:56:30 +02:00
mempool uptime kuma: remove every live reference, repoint the probes to Gatus 2026-09-14 10:30:28 +02:00
monero monero: check the node once a day, not every five minutes 2026-09-27 11:08:36 +02:00
navidrome navidrome: a music server on its own box, with beets in front of it 2026-09-27 11:09:40 +02:00
phoenixd uptime kuma: remove every live reference, repoint the probes to Gatus 2026-09-14 10:30:28 +02:00
signal_api alerting: Signal via signal-cli-rest-api, and faster failure detection 2026-09-14 21:40:37 +02:00
socket_proxy bitcoin-knots, fulcrum, datum-gateway: add and use the socket_proxy role 2026-09-11 23:50:15 +02:00
xmrblocks monero: check the node once a day, not every five minutes 2026-09-27 11:08:36 +02:00