Jar Lid Archive (Django + Postgres 18 + SeaweedFS) on jar-lid-archive-staging-box (nodito VM 3300, 1 core / 1 GB / 10 GB), public at jars-staging.contrapeso.xyz through vipy's Caddy. New role roles/jar_lid_archive; per-host values in host_vars, so a production host is a new [jar_lid_archive] entry, not a new playbook. ── Containers, following :master ────────────────────────────────────────── The same three services as the app repo's compose.yaml, so staging rehearses what dev and CI run. Every playbook run pulls :master and `up -d --wait`s; compose recreates web only when the digest moved. --wait gates on web's /health/, which checks the database and the bucket, so a green run means the app serves. Upgrading is re-running the playbook. ── web is on the host network ───────────────────────────────────────────── Docker's published ports are DNATed before UFW sees them, so `8000:8000` would answer on the LAN whatever UFW says, and binding to the tailnet IP races tailscaled at boot. On the host network gunicorn's port is an ordinary one: UFW default-deny covers the LAN, tailscaled's ts-input accepts tailscale0 ahead of UFW (checked on mempool-box), and the headscale ACL grants tag:prd-vipy exactly :8000. db and storage publish on 127.0.0.1 only. Verified: LAN times out, vipy gets 200. That matters for HTTPS: the app trusts X-Forwarded-Proto (DJANGO_BEHIND_TLS_PROXY=1), which is only safe while Caddy is the sole client. Login POST through the public URL passes CSRF; cookies are Secure. ── Secrets ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Generated straight into host_vars/jar_lid_staging_local/vault.yml, never printed: Django key, Postgres and S3 secrets, and seed passwords for the fixture's alice/bob/admin usernames - never the fixture's published passwords, since the site is public. The group vault gains one line, this host's Gatus push token; decrypted, it differs from before by exactly that line. ── Backups, and the outage the first one caused ─────────────────────────── One uncompressed tar (pg_dump -Fc + the SeaweedFS data dir), age-encrypted on the box at 02:20, pulled by small-backups-box; 3 days at both ends. Verified end to end, including decrypting a pulled artefact on lapy. The first test run stopped web AND storage and left the app down 26 minutes: SeaweedFS outlasted its 150s healthcheck budget on this disk, compose marked it unhealthy, and web's depends_on never started it. Now only web is stopped - it is the only writer to both stores, so they are still captured at one instant - and the healthchecks have start_periods sized for the disk. Also inherited from the app's compose.yaml: storage writes /tmp/s3.json and chowns it to seaweed, so on a RESTART of the same container root cannot re-create it (sticky /tmp + protected_regular): "Permission denied". Fixed here with rm -f first; the app repo needs the same line. ── The disk is the problem ──────────────────────────────────────────────── The VM disk is on proxmox-tank-1, the HDD mirror, which knots-box's random reads (~6 MB/s) keep near saturation. Inside this VM: ~96% "full" I/O pressure while idle, ~5 min to start web, sudo occasionally over 12s. Moving it to local-zfs (NVMe) is the fix; noted in the README, not done. ── Also ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── - lan_ip read from the Proxmox guest agent; host key checked against the one the agent reads off the disk before it went into known_hosts. - Monitoring: liveness + disk (400), probe_jar-lid-archive-staging (403), public /health/ + DNS (402), backup-dump/backup-store. - tofu: the VM definition. - Deployed v2026.10.03.1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
82 lines
4.1 KiB
YAML
82 lines
4.1 KiB
YAML
---
|
|
# The per-service health probes.
|
|
#
|
|
# These are NOT the same thing as the systemd checks in infra/401. Those answer
|
|
# "is the unit running"; these answer "does the service actually respond" - an
|
|
# RPC call to bitcoind, a TCP connect to Fulcrum's Electrum port, an HTTP fetch
|
|
# from the Mempool backend. A process can be perfectly `active` and useless,
|
|
# which is precisely the gap these close.
|
|
#
|
|
# The checks themselves live in each service's own role, deployed by that
|
|
# service's playbook. This play only registers where they report, because the
|
|
# endpoints must exist in Gatus before the first push arrives.
|
|
#
|
|
# They used to push to Uptime Kuma. The scripts now POST with a bearer token
|
|
# instead of GETting ?status=up, and each host uses its own token.
|
|
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Alerting thresholds, and why they differ by check type.
|
|
#
|
|
# `failure-threshold` counts CONSECUTIVE failures, but "consecutive" means a
|
|
# different amount of wall-clock time per check:
|
|
#
|
|
# push/heartbeat endpoints a failure is produced once per heartbeat window
|
|
# pulled endpoints a failure is produced once per interval
|
|
#
|
|
# So the default of 3 would mean 33 minutes on an 11m heartbeat and over a day
|
|
# on a 7h one - and the heartbeat window ALREADY encodes the tolerance. An 11m
|
|
# window on a 5-minute push is precisely "one missed push forgiven"; stacking a
|
|
# threshold of 3 on top triples a tolerance that was already chosen.
|
|
#
|
|
# Hence: push endpoints alert on the FIRST heartbeat failure. Pulled endpoints
|
|
# have no built-in tolerance, so the threshold is where it belongs for them.
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
- name: Register the per-service probes with Gatus
|
|
hosts: observability
|
|
become: yes
|
|
|
|
vars:
|
|
probes:
|
|
- {name: bitcoin-knots, host: knots_box_local}
|
|
- {name: datum-gateway, host: knots_box_local}
|
|
- {name: fulcrum, host: fulcrum_box_local}
|
|
- {name: phoenixd, host: vipy}
|
|
- {name: forgejo-runner, host: forgejo_runner_local}
|
|
- {name: mempool-mariadb, host: mempool_box_local}
|
|
- {name: mempool-backend, host: mempool_box_local}
|
|
- {name: mempool-frontend, host: mempool_box_local}
|
|
# The two Monero probes push ONCE A DAY, not every 5 minutes, so they
|
|
# need a window wider than a day. 26h, not 24h: the window must exceed
|
|
# the push interval or a check that reports exactly on time races its own
|
|
# deadline and alerts on jitter. The timers are OnCalendar 05:00 and
|
|
# 05:30 with RandomizedDelaySec=900, so the true worst case is ~24h15m.
|
|
# Cadence lives in roles/{monero,xmrblocks}/defaults/main.yml; the two
|
|
# are one decision and must move together.
|
|
- {name: monerod, host: monerod_box_local, heartbeat: '26h'}
|
|
- {name: xmrblocks, host: monerod_box_local, heartbeat: '26h'}
|
|
- {name: navidrome, host: music_box_local}
|
|
- {name: jar-lid-archive-staging, host: jar_lid_staging_local}
|
|
|
|
tasks:
|
|
- name: Build the probe endpoint list
|
|
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
|
|
probe_endpoints: "{{ probe_endpoints | default([]) + [{
|
|
'name': item.name,
|
|
'group': 'probe',
|
|
'token': gatus_push_tokens[item.host],
|
|
'heartbeat': item.heartbeat | default('11m')}] }}"
|
|
loop: "{{ probes }}"
|
|
|
|
- name: Register the probe endpoints
|
|
ansible.builtin.include_role:
|
|
name: gatus_endpoint
|
|
vars:
|
|
gatus_endpoint_default_alerts:
|
|
- type: signal
|
|
# 1, not 3: the heartbeat window is the tolerance. See the note above.
|
|
failure-threshold: 1
|
|
success-threshold: 2
|
|
send-on-resolved: true
|
|
minimum-reminder-interval: 6h
|
|
gatus_endpoint_name: probes
|
|
gatus_endpoint_external: "{{ probe_endpoints }}"
|