Commit graph

5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
85040d5f67
watchtower: remove from the estate, and with it ntfy
watchtower is being destroyed. Removed from [vps], with its host_vars, its push
token, and the six Gatus endpoints that referenced it (liveness, disk, two
systemd services, the ntfy DNS record and the ntfy HTTP check).

ntfy went with it - it ran nowhere else - so services/ntfy is deleted,
subdomains.ntfy and ntfy_topic are gone from group_vars, and the ntfy playbook
is out of site.yml. ntfy_topic already had no readers: the three infra/4xx plays
that used it were deleted when their checks were superseded.

Two things this exposed.

services/ntfy/deploy_ntfy_playbook.yml was pointing at the WRONG MACHINE. It
said `hosts: observability`, which resolves to the host `monitoring`
(64.226.70.190) - but ntfy ran on watchtower, and ntfy.contrapeso.xyz pointed
there. Running it would have installed ntfy on the new VPS. Moot now, but it is
the same stale-identity failure as the rest: the group meant watchtower when the
play was written, and nobody revisited it when the group changed. Watchtower was
in [vps] and NO role group at all, while running caddy, ntfy and Uptime Kuma -
nothing in the repo managed any of it.

More seriously: ntfy-emergency-app on vipy (avisame.contrapeso.xyz) sends its
notifications to https://ntfy.contrapeso.xyz, topic "emergencia". Destroying
watchtower breaks it, and it is an EMERGENCY notifier - it would fail silently
at exactly the moment it matters. That is NOT resolved here, deliberately:
standing ntfy up elsewhere, pointing at ntfy.sh, or retiring the app are all
decisions, not cleanups.

What this change does is make the break impossible to miss. The URL was derived
from subdomains.ntfy, so deleting that would have turned it into an undefined
variable buried in a template. It is now an explicit ntfy_service_url in the
app's own vars, still holding the old value, with the three options written
above it. The ntfy credentials stay in the vault because that app still needs
them - the vault was restored from HEAD and only watchtower's push token
removed, rather than re-handling the plaintext.

Verified: no reference to watchtower or its IP anywhere in the repo; Gatus down
from 91 to 85 endpoints, 85 UP, 0 DOWN.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 11:26:47 +02:00
efa9eb55ca
monitoring: systemd services, domain expiry, DNS correctness, public endpoints
Four more check types, 42 endpoints, taking the estate from 39 to 81.

── systemd services (infra/401) ────────────────────────────────────────────
Every unit we deploy, checked every 5 minutes with a 16-minute heartbeat.

This closes the gap that let a real bug run unnoticed earlier today: a backup
script left forgejo, lnbits, headscale and memos stopped, and NOTHING caught
it. The dumps exited 0, the artefacts were correct, the deploy said failed=0,
and liveness only proves the HOST is up - not that anything on it serves.

One endpoint PER UNIT but only ONE timer per host: the check iterates that
host's units and pushes a result for each, the way check-backups.sh reports per
source. Four units on vipy would otherwise mean four scripts, services and
timers. A single host-level red light would also say "something on vipy is
down" without saying which, which is not the question anyone has.

Keys are host-qualified because unit names collide - caddy runs on four
machines. Which units a host runs lives in host_vars/<host>/monitored_services,
because "what runs here" is a property of the machine, the same reasoning as
the cross-host ports.

nut-driver-enumerator is deliberately excluded: it is a oneshot generator that
is `enabled` but always `inactive`, so it would report down forever. Checked
live before excluding it.

── domain, DNS and public endpoints (infra/402) ────────────────────────────
The first checks that PULL rather than push, and that is the right way round:
all three are about how the outside world sees us, so they must be measured
from outside. Nothing is installed anywhere - no script, no timer, no token.
They also have no heartbeat, because a heartbeat answers "did the reporter
report"; when Gatus does the checking itself, failure is immediate.

  domain   1 endpoint,  24h, [DOMAIN_EXPIRATION] > 336h (two weeks)
  dns      11 endpoints, 24h, [DNS_RCODE] == NOERROR and [BODY] == the IP
  public   14 endpoints, 5m,  11 HTTPS + 3 TCP

Expected A records are derived from inventory (hostvars[host].ansible_host),
not written down again. The estate's recurring bug is an address recorded in a
second place and left behind when the machine moved; asserting against
inventory means a renumbered box is one edit, not two.

Expected HTTP status was checked live per site rather than assumed. Two return
401 - the Gatus dashboard and the DATUM dashboard, both behind basic auth - and
that is what is asserted: expecting 200 there would go green precisely when the
auth broke. headscale asserts /health rather than /, which is a 404 by design.
Every HTTPS check also carries [CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION] > 168h, which is free
on an endpoint already being polled and catches a renewal that silently stops.

Two things learned the hard way, both now in comments:

  * A domain-expiry endpoint needs a URL SCHEME. Gatus derives the endpoint type
    from the prefix (endpoint.Type()), so a bare "contrapeso.xyz" is UNKNOWN and
    the whole config is rejected. It is https:// plus a DOMAIN_EXPIRATION
    condition and no status assertion, so the registrar's parking page at the
    apex is irrelevant. Upstream also enforces a 5m minimum interval for that
    placeholder, because it uses a free whois service.

  * That rejection proved skip-invalid-config-update was worth adding. Gatus
    logged "the configuration file was updated, but it is not valid, the old
    configuration will continue being used" and kept running. Without it the
    reload path calls panic() and one malformed contributed file takes the
    monitor down.

Verified: 15/15 service endpoints UP; 26/27 public-facing UP. The single DOWN is
public_memos, correctly - memos-box is powered off, and the condition result
reads [STATUS] (502) == 200. memos-box and arbret-staging-box were shut down
deliberately from the Proxmox UI to test the liveness endpoints; their endpoints
stay registered and will go green when the VMs return.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 09:33:57 +02:00
3711421af5
ansible: move the cross-host ports to host_vars, delete services_config.yml
The four ports were the only entries in services_config.yml with a real
justification: each is read twice, by the role that deploys the service on its
own box AND by a socket-proxy or Caddy play that runs on the EDGE host and
publishes it. A role default is invisible to that second play.

But the shape was wrong in two ways. The file had to be named in vars_files: by
30 plays - opt-in configuration that someone will eventually forget - and five
role defaults silently interpolated service_settings.*, so bitcoin_knots,
fulcrum, datum_gateway and mempool were not self-contained: using any of them
without that one vars_file entry broke it.

Each port now lives in host_vars/<owning box>/main.yml:

  host_vars/knots_box_local/main.yml    bitcoin_p2p_port, datum_gateway_api_port,
                                        datum_gateway_stratum_port
  host_vars/fulcrum_box_local/main.yml  fulcrum_ssl_port
  host_vars/mempool_box_local/main.yml  mempool_frontend_port

host_vars auto-loads and outranks role defaults, so the owning role picks the
value up with no vars_files at all, and the edge play reads the same single
definition as hostvars['<host>'].<name>. The role defaults keep the protocol
standard (8333, 50002, ...) so each role still works standalone, with the live
deployment's value in host_vars winning.

Also fixed a fourth copy of an inventory identity: the mempool Caddy play had
"mempool-box:{{ ... }}" hardcoded in the upstream. It now derives the host from
hostvars['mempool_box_local'].ansible_host, so inventory is the only place any
box's name is written down.

services_config.yml is deleted, with 25 more vars_files entries across 19
playbooks. Between this and the previous commit, 87 vars_files entries are gone
and every variable in the repo now comes from group_vars/all, host_vars,
inventory, a role default, or that service's own *_vars.yml.

Verification: an edge-host probe resolves all eight ports and hostnames to
byte-identical values to the ones services_config.yml used to supply. Each
owning host resolves its own port through host_vars. All 37 playbooks'
--list-tasks output is unchanged. The four edge plays that consume these values
all check-diff changed=0 - the socket-proxy and Caddy units on vipy are
byte-identical, which is the direct proof the rewiring landed on the same
values. fulcrum and datum-gateway check-diff exactly as before (ok=28/changed=1
and ok=15/changed=1, both the known timer re-arm).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 21:02:57 +02:00
0f03c503c8
nodito: de-Uptime-Kuma the ZFS and NUT playbooks, extract templates
These two are host-specific by design - nodito is a pet, not cattle - so they
stay playbooks rather than becoming roles. But they had rotted.

De-Kuma, following the pattern of the six service roles:

  Both plays opened with an assert on uptime_kuma_username/password, which were
  removed from the vault, so both failed before doing anything. Dropped that,
  the two embedded Python monitor-creation scripts, and their /tmp cleanup.
  Kept every check, threshold and systemd timer - those are the durable part.

  Reporting is now generic: `healthcheck_push_url` goes into the unit as
  Environment=HEALTHCHECK_PUSH_URL and the script reads ${HEALTHCHECK_PUSH_URL:-},
  treating empty as normal rather than an error. The exit code is the real
  answer; systemd keeps it. Both scripts now also report status=down on failure
  instead of only going silent. Live push URLs harvested into the vault so
  nothing observable changes for ZFS.

Three live bugs found while check-diffing:

  1. 32_zfs would have DE-REGISTERED the Proxmox storage. `pvesm remove` was
     gated on the storage existing and `pvesm add` on it NOT existing - mutually
     exclusive - so a real run removed the proxmox-tank-1 entry backing every VM
     and never put it back. It would also have dropped `mountpoint /var/lib/vz`,
     which the live entry has and `pvesm add` does not set. Registration is now
     add-only.

  2. zfs_disk_1 named ata-...WX11TN0Z, a disk no longer in the machine. The live
     mirror is WX120LHQ + WX11TN2P; a leg was replaced and the repo never caught
     up. Inert behind `when: zfs_pool_exists.rc != 0`, but wrong on any
     disaster-recovery run. This is the seventh instance of an identifier
     written down once whose hardware later moved.

  3. 34_nut has NEVER been applied to nodito - no /etc/nut file carries the
     "Managed by Ansible" marker; they were written by hand in January 2026. The
     vault held the literal CHANGE_ME_TO_SECURE_PASSWORD, so applying it would
     have overwritten a working upsd/upsmon auth pair with a placeholder and
     restarted NUT, leaving the hypervisor's UPS unable to trigger a clean
     shutdown on mains loss. The Kuma assert was the only thing stopping that,
     so removing it without a replacement would have armed the gun: there is now
     an explicit assert that refuses to run on the placeholder. The real
     password is in the vault and `Configure upsd users` check-diffs clean.

  Templates reconciled with the live files first, so applying 34_nut is close to
  a no-op: added `maxretry = 3` to ups.conf and OFFDURATION / RBWARNTIME /
  NOCOMMWARNTIME / FINALDELAY plus quoted POWERDOWNFLAG to upsmon.conf. The only
  substantive additions left are the NOTIFYMSG/NOTIFYFLAG syslog lines.

  /usr/local/bin/ups-heartbeat.sh on the box is an orphan - mode 0644, not
  executable, referenced by no unit and no cron entry - but its push token
  belongs to a monitor that still exists and answers, so that monitor has had no
  heartbeat since January. Harvested as healthcheck_push_urls.ups; applying this
  play is what will finally feed it.

Finish the host_vars migration:

  infra/nodito/nodito_vars.yml was byte-identical to host_vars/nodito/main.yml.
  Deleted it, moved nodito_secrets.yml to host_vars/nodito/vault.yml, and
  stripped the dead vars_files entries from all three playbooks.

Extract the 13 inline `content: |` blocks to infra/nodito/templates/, pulled via
a YAML load rather than retyped. 681+582 lines become 313+344 plus templates.
Ownership parity against HEAD checked mechanically: no owner/group/mode drift on
any surviving task.

Neither playbook has been applied. ZFS play 2 check-runs failed=0 with two
changes: the script rewrite (the deployed one is a hand-edited DEBUG VERSION
with `set -x`) and the Environment line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 19:07:50 +02:00
b0f14ea365
vars 2026-09-11 22:17:13 +02:00