Commit graph

7 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
356139290f
mempool: convert to a role, de-Uptime-Kuma the health checks
745-line playbook becomes 37 lines (the role, plus the Caddy play for the edge
host) and a 408-line role with docker/deploy/healthcheck phases and six
templates. mempool_vars.yml is deleted; its content is the role's defaults.

Three health checks are kept, not collapsed: Mempool is three moving parts and
knowing which one is down is the point. Each has its own script, unit, timer and
push_url, driven by a mempool_healthchecks list. The Uptime Kuma specifics are
gone - the embedded Python creating monitors over the API, the /tmp credentials
file, the push-URL file read back and parsed, three Environment= rewrites - and
the three live push URLs are preserved from the vault, so reporting is unchanged.

`Enable and start health check timers` and `Display deployment status` were both
guarded by uptime_kuma_enabled despite being deployment tasks. Third service in
a row with that pattern: the deprecation banner was applied to contiguous blocks,
so anything sitting near the push plumbing was disabled with it. Ungated.

TWO OWNERSHIP PROBLEMS, different in kind:

- MINE: I wrote `owner: root` on docker-compose.yml where the original says
  `owner: "{{ ansible_user }}"`. A straight violation of extract-mechanically-
  change-nothing, caught only by reading the check-mode diff line by line.
  Reverted to match the original.

- PRE-EXISTING, and dangerous: the playbook declared
  `owner: "{{ ansible_user }}"` (1000) on the MariaDB data directory, which the
  container owns as uid 999. Confirmed against `git show HEAD:` before
  concluding it was not mine. It had drifted since the containers were created
  and went unnoticed because the playbook had not been run since.

  This was not academic. The first real run pulled a newer mariadb:10.11 and
  recreated mempool-db; with the chown still in place MariaDB would have come
  back to a data directory it could not write. The role now ensures the
  directory exists and leaves ownership to the container. Verified after the
  run: /opt/mempool/mysql is still 999:999 and all three containers are healthy.

  This is a deliberate behaviour change, not part of the extraction. It is in
  this commit rather than a follow-up because the faithful version was never
  safe to run, so there was no intermediate state worth recording as verified.

mempool_frontend_port moved to services_config.yml: two hosts need it (this role
deploys the frontend, the Caddy play proxies to it from the edge host) and a role
default is invisible to the second play. caddy_site's parameter assert caught
this loudly - "'mempool_frontend_port' is undefined" - rather than silently.

Verified: check-mode diff clean apart from unavoidable check-mode artifacts;
first run ok=24 changed=5, zero failures; second run changed=2 - the two bare
`command:` tasks (pull, compose up) that have no changed_when and always report
changed. That is the idempotent floor. All three health checks report
ExecMainStatus 0 with their push URLs intact.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 18:49:11 +02:00
73340d5fbe
forgejo-runner: convert to a role, de-Uptime-Kuma the health check
409-line playbook becomes a 16-line playbook plus a 318-line role with phases
split across tasks/{prerequisites,install,configure,service,healthcheck}.yml and
four templates. forgejo_runner_vars.yml is deleted; its content is the role's
defaults.

Applies the Plan 6 Stage 0 decision: keep whatever determines whether the
service is healthy, drop the Uptime Kuma specifics, make the reporting point
pluggable. Gone from the role: the embedded Python that created monitors over
the Kuma API, the /tmp credentials file, token extraction, the systemd
Environment= rewrite, and 8 `when: uptime_kuma_enabled` guards. What remains is
the check itself, its log, the systemd unit and timer, and an honest exit code -
`systemctl is-failed forgejo-runner-healthcheck.service` now answers the
question with no monitoring system involved at all.

Reporting is one variable, healthcheck_push_url, empty by default. Any endpoint
that accepts an HTTP ping plugs in there. A pull-based monitor wants it left
empty and reads unit state instead.

PREMISE CORRECTION: Uptime Kuma is NOT dead. Plan 3 recorded "48 push timers
curling an endpoint that no longer answers" and Plan 6 said the check had
"nowhere to report to". Both wrong - 24+ push scripts across 11 hosts are
pushing successfully right now (HTTP 200). Only the Ansible code and the vault
credentials were decommissioned; the service never stopped. So the existing push
URLs were harvested into a vaulted healthcheck_push_urls dict and are preserved,
keeping this refactor behaviour-neutral. Retiring Kuma stays a deliberate act
rather than a side effect. PLAN_3 and PLAN_6 are corrected.

Verified:
  - task-list diff vs the old playbook shows ONLY the five Kuma tasks removed,
    everything else identical and in the same order
  - first run ok=22 changed=1 (the rewritten health script); both systemd units
    and forgejo-runner.service came back ok, so the templates reproduce the
    previous files byte-for-byte
  - second run ok=22 changed=0, fully idempotent
  - still reports "Ping sent successfully (HTTP 200)" from a script containing
    zero Uptime Kuma references
  - the 4 skipped tasks are genuine already-configured guards, checked not assumed

Two things for the next service:

- import_tasks, not include_tasks. Dynamic includes are opaque to --list-tasks,
  which is the primary verification tool here; the first attempt produced a
  useless diff.
- `Assert runner is running` was guarded by uptime_kuma_enabled and so had not
  run since the decommissioning. It is not monitoring, it is the deployment
  checking its own work - the deprecation banner swept it up with the Kuma
  plumbing, and a runner that failed to start was deploying "successfully" in
  silence. Ungated now. The banner was applied to contiguous blocks, so read
  every uptime_kuma_enabled guard and ask whether it is monitoring or deployment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 18:15:29 +02:00
394f2519ff
age backups everywhere 2026-09-12 16:20:42 +02:00
16cbd189b8
ntfy, datum-gateway, headscale: use the caddy_site role
Completes Stage 3. No hand-rolled Caddy plumbing remains anywhere:
`grep sites-enabled` outside roles/ returns nothing, and so does
`grep "systemctl reload caddy"`.

ntfy uses caddy_site_body for its plain-HTTP listener and @httpget redirect.
Verified ok/unchanged against watchtower; the one other changed task is a
pre-existing "Update APT cache".

datum-gateway keeps a whole-Caddyfile validate after the role call. The role
validates its own fragment, but only a whole-file validate catches a conflict
between two sites, and this playbook was the only one that ever had it. Its
two debug tasks that echoed command output are gone with the commands.

headscale is the one that mattered. Its playbook wrote
`reverse_proxy localhost:8080`, but spacey is actually running a /admin*
route in front of Headplane behind Caddy basic auth. Running that playbook
would have deleted the admin route and its auth - a hazard that predates this
work. It now renders the config that is really there, verified ok/unchanged
via --start-at-task (the play cannot reach Caddy in check mode: "Install
headscale package" fails because the .deb is not really downloaded, before
and after this edit alike).

Supporting changes for headscale:
  - headscale_ui_password_hash added to infra_secrets.yml and the identical
    group_vars/all/vault.yml, read from the live config on spacey. The vault
    already had headscale_ui_username (= counterweight, confirmed) and
    headscale_ui_password; I did not verify the password is the plaintext of
    this hash.
  - headplane_port added to headscale_vars.yml.
  - The role's handler now sets become: true. Handlers do not inherit become
    from the task that notified them, and this play runs become: no.
  - The include uses `apply: become: yes`; `become:` on an include_role is
    rejected outright.

All 14 site files on all 3 hosts still byte-identical.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 23:37:38 +02:00
2dabc6ad62
uptime-kuma: add uptime_kuma_enabled flag and make monitoring blocks inert
Removing the credentials would otherwise break these playbooks mid-deploy: they
template uptime_kuma_password with no assert to stop them first. 100 tasks are
now guarded by uptime_kuma_enabled (false), so deployments run normally and the
monitoring sections skip. A further 28 tasks were already self-guarding on
monitor_setup/push_url being defined; verified that a skipped task's registered
variable makes those skip cleanly rather than error.

The blocks are kept on purpose — the health-check logic is the durable part and
should be rewired to whatever replaces Uptime Kuma.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 22:43:55 +02:00
80c9e6f3e3
uptime-kuma: remove credentials from the vaults
Drops uptime_kuma_username/password from infra_secrets.yml and its group_vars
copy and example, plus a dead push token in nodito_secrets.yml that nothing
referenced. They remain in git history — rotation is what actually retires them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 22:43:15 +02:00
b0f14ea365
vars 2026-09-11 22:17:13 +02:00