backup stuff

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counterweight 2026-09-12 16:02:00 +02:00
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# `backup_source`
Makes a host back **itself** up: dump to stdout, encrypt with `age`, write to a
local directory, prune, on a systemd timer. `small-backups-box` pulls the
directory later (see `backup_store`).
Modelled on `prd-arbret`, which has been doing exactly this correctly since
before the rest of the estate was migrated.
## Usage
```yaml
- ansible.builtin.include_role:
name: backup_source
vars:
backup_source_name: headscale
backup_source_description: "Headscale"
backup_source_dump_command: "tar -czf - -C / var/lib/headscale etc/headscale"
backup_source_stop_service: headscale
backup_source_retention_days: 7
```
Produces `/opt/backups/headscale/headscale_<YYYYmmdd_HHMMSS>.tar.gz.age`,
`headscale-backup.{service,timer}`, and `/usr/local/bin/headscale-backup.sh`.
## Why the source encrypts, not the destination
`age -r <recipient>` is asymmetric and the host holds only the **public** key, so
a compromised host cannot read its own backups — or anyone else's. The scripts
this replaces encrypted with GPG *on the laptop, after the data had already
crossed the network*, which protects the artefact at rest but not in transit.
The matching identity lives only on lapy and is escrowed. **Lose it and every
artefact everywhere becomes noise**, including arbret's.
## `backup_source_dump_command` writes to STDOUT
The role pipes it into `age`, so plaintext never touches the disk. Use `-C /`
with relative paths in `tar` rather than absolute ones: it avoids tar's "removing
leading /" and makes the restore target explicit.
## The trap is the reason this role exists
When `backup_source_stop_service` is set, the script stops the unit and installs
an EXIT trap that starts it again. Without it, a failed dump leaves the service
down until the next timer fires — **every hand-written script this replaced had
that bug**, and it was only ever masked because their `systemctl stop` failed
first, before anything was stopped.
Verified on spacey: with the dump forced to fail, the log shows
`Stopping → Writing → Restarting`, the script exits 1 (so systemd marks the unit
failed rather than hiding it), and headscale is `active` afterwards.
If `systemctl stop` itself fails, `set -e` exits *before* the trap is installed —
which is correct, because nothing was stopped.
## `.partial`
The dump writes `<artifact>.partial` and only `mv`s it into place on success, so
a truncated file is never mistaken for a backup. A failure inside the pipeline
does leave one behind, and the prune glob cannot match it (it ends `.partial`,
not `.tar.gz.age`), so the script clears stale partials at the **start** of each
run. Tested by failing mid-pipeline: 1 partial left, 0 after the next run.
## `backup_source_stop_service` may be a bare name
`headscale` and `headscale.service` both work. The unit template normalises it,
because systemd rejects a bare name in `After=` with
`Failed to add dependency ... Invalid argument` — which it logs and then ignores,
so the unit appears to work while carrying no ordering at all.
## Retention is two-tier
`backup_source_retention_days` is **local** and short — these hosts are
disk-constrained. The long tail lives on `small-backups-box`, which decides its
own retention per source. Losing the local copy is expected and fine.

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---
# Required
backup_source_name: "" # "headscale" -> headscale_<ts>.tar.gz.age
backup_source_description: "" # "Headscale"
backup_source_dump_command: "" # must write the payload to STDOUT
# Placement
backup_source_dir: "/opt/backups/{{ backup_source_name }}"
backup_source_artifact_suffix: "tar.gz.age"
# Encryption. Asymmetric: the host holds only the public key and cannot decrypt
# what it produces.
backup_source_recipient: "{{ age_backup_recipient }}"
# The unprivileged account small-backups-box pulls as. It owns the dump
# directory and nothing else; it deliberately has no sudo.
backup_source_pull_user: backup-pull
backup_source_pull_key: "{{ backup_pull_public_key }}"
# Safety
backup_source_stop_service: "" # local unit stopped for the dump, restored by a trap
# Retention here is LOCAL and short; small-backups-box keeps the long tail.
backup_source_retention_days: 7
# Schedule. The box pulls at 04:00, so dumps must land before that.
backup_source_on_calendar: "*-*-* 02:00:00"

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---
- name: Reload systemd for backup units
ansible.builtin.systemd:
daemon_reload: yes

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---
- name: Assert backup_source parameters are sane
ansible.builtin.assert:
that:
- backup_source_name | length > 0
- backup_source_description | length > 0
- backup_source_dump_command | length > 0
- backup_source_recipient | length > 0
- backup_source_recipient is match('^age1[0-9a-z]{58}$')
fail_msg: >-
backup_source: '{{ backup_source_name | default("<unnamed>") }}' needs a name,
description, dump command and a valid age recipient (age1... 62 chars).
quiet: true
# Declared here rather than assumed. Stage 1 installed it by hand; this is what
# makes a rebuilt host get it too.
- name: Ensure age is installed
ansible.builtin.apt:
name: age
state: present
update_cache: yes
cache_valid_time: 3600
# The pull account: unprivileged, no sudo, exists only so small-backups-box can
# read the dump directory. Trust points one way — the box can read backups, and
# can do nothing else on this host.
- name: "Ensure the {{ backup_source_pull_user }} account exists"
ansible.builtin.user:
name: "{{ backup_source_pull_user }}"
system: yes
shell: /bin/sh # rsync-over-ssh needs a shell; nologin breaks it
home: "/var/lib/{{ backup_source_pull_user }}"
create_home: yes
password: '!' # no password login, ever
when: backup_source_pull_user | length > 0
- name: "Authorise the backup box's key for {{ backup_source_pull_user }}"
ansible.posix.authorized_key:
user: "{{ backup_source_pull_user }}"
key: "{{ backup_source_pull_key }}"
key_options: "restrict" # no pty, no forwarding, no user rc
exclusive: yes
state: present
when: backup_source_pull_user | length > 0
# The shared container above the per-service directories. It must be traversable
# or the pull account cannot reach its own directory. The script's `mkdir -p`
# runs under `umask 077` and would otherwise create this 0700.
- name: "Ensure {{ backup_source_dir | dirname }} is traversable"
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ backup_source_dir | dirname }}"
state: directory
owner: root
group: root
mode: '0755'
- name: "Ensure {{ backup_source_dir }} exists"
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ backup_source_dir }}"
state: directory
owner: root
group: "{{ backup_source_pull_user | default('root', true) }}"
mode: '0750'
- name: "Install the {{ backup_source_name }} backup script"
ansible.builtin.template:
src: backup.sh.j2
dest: "/usr/local/bin/{{ backup_source_name }}-backup.sh"
owner: root
group: root
mode: '0750'
validate: "bash -n %s"
- name: "Install the {{ backup_source_name }}-backup systemd units"
ansible.builtin.template:
src: "backup.{{ item }}.j2"
dest: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ backup_source_name }}-backup.{{ item }}"
owner: root
group: root
mode: '0644'
loop: [service, timer]
notify: Reload systemd for backup units
- name: "Enable the {{ backup_source_name }}-backup timer"
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: "{{ backup_source_name }}-backup.timer"
enabled: yes
state: started
daemon_reload: yes

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[Unit]
Description={{ backup_source_description }} backup
{% if backup_source_stop_service %}
{# systemd rejects a bare name here ("Failed to add dependency ... Invalid
argument"), so normalise to a full unit name. #}
After={{ backup_source_stop_service if '.' in backup_source_stop_service else backup_source_stop_service ~ '.service' }}
{% endif %}
[Service]
Type=oneshot
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/{{ backup_source_name }}-backup.sh
StandardOutput=journal
StandardError=journal
SyslogIdentifier={{ backup_source_name }}-backup

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# {{ backup_source_description }} backup — managed by Ansible (roles/backup_source)
#
# Dumps to stdout, encrypts with age, writes {{ backup_source_dir }}.
# The host holds only the age PUBLIC key, so it cannot read its own backups.
set -euo pipefail
umask 077
BACKUP_DIR="{{ backup_source_dir }}"
RETENTION_DAYS={{ backup_source_retention_days }}
RECIPIENT="{{ backup_source_recipient }}"
SUFFIX="{{ backup_source_artifact_suffix }}"
NAME="{{ backup_source_name }}"
{% if backup_source_stop_service %}
SERVICE="{{ backup_source_stop_service }}"
{% endif %}
TIMESTAMP=$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
ARTIFACT="${BACKUP_DIR}/${NAME}_${TIMESTAMP}.${SUFFIX}"
die() { echo "FATAL: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
log() { echo "$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S') $*"; }
# --- Pre-flight ---
[[ -n "$RECIPIENT" ]] || die "no age recipient configured"
command -v age >/dev/null || die "age is not installed"
# Mode must agree with what the role sets, or each undoes the other every run.
mkdir -p "$BACKUP_DIR"
{% if backup_source_pull_user %}
chown root:{{ backup_source_pull_user }} "$BACKUP_DIR"
chmod 750 "$BACKUP_DIR"
{% else %}
chmod 700 "$BACKUP_DIR"
{% endif %}
# A run that died mid-dump leaves a .partial. It is not a backup, and the prune
# glob below cannot match it (it ends .partial, not .${SUFFIX}), so clear them
# here or they accumulate forever.
rm -f "${BACKUP_DIR}/${NAME}_"*.partial
{% if backup_source_stop_service %}
# --- Stop the service, and guarantee it comes back ---
# The trap is the point: without it a failed dump leaves the service down until
# the next timer fires. Every hand-written script this replaced had that bug.
log "Stopping ${SERVICE}..."
systemctl stop "$SERVICE"
trap 'log "Restarting ${SERVICE}..."; systemctl start "${SERVICE}" || true' EXIT
{% endif %}
# --- Dump straight into age; plaintext never touches the disk ---
log "Writing ${ARTIFACT}..."
{{ backup_source_dump_command }} | age -r "$RECIPIENT" -o "${ARTIFACT}.partial"
mv "${ARTIFACT}.partial" "$ARTIFACT"
{% if backup_source_pull_user %}
# Readable by the pull account and nobody else. The contents are age-encrypted
# regardless, so this is depth rather than the actual protection.
chown root:{{ backup_source_pull_user }} "$ARTIFACT"
chmod 640 "$ARTIFACT"
{% else %}
chmod 600 "$ARTIFACT"
{% endif %}
log "Wrote ${ARTIFACT} ($(du -h "$ARTIFACT" | cut -f1))"
# --- Prune ---
log "Pruning local artefacts older than ${RETENTION_DAYS} days..."
find "$BACKUP_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name "${NAME}_*.${SUFFIX}" -mtime +"${RETENTION_DAYS}" -delete
log "Done."

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[Unit]
Description={{ backup_source_description }} backup
[Timer]
OnCalendar={{ backup_source_on_calendar }}
# Persistent: a window missed while the host was down runs on next boot. cron on
# a laptop had no equivalent, which is how two backups went unnoticed for months.
Persistent=true
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target

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# `backup_store`
Pulls already-encrypted backup artefacts from every source host onto
`small-backups-box`, on a timer, and expires them per source.
Generalises the hand-written `pull-backups.sh` that had one hardcoded source
(`arbret`). That job's behaviour is preserved exactly: same source path, same
90 days, same destination directory.
## This host holds no key
Everything pulled here is ciphertext produced by `backup_source` on the source
host. The box cannot read any of it — the age identity lives only on lapy. That
is deliberate: the machine holding every backup should not also be able to open
them.
## One failing source must not stop the others
The script is `set -uo pipefail`, **not** `-e`. Each source runs in its own
function, failures are counted, and the script exits non-zero at the end so
systemd marks the unit failed. A dead host costs you that one source, not the
whole run.
This is the specific failure the whole plan exists to prevent: the laptop jobs
aborted on first error and then silently produced empty directories for nine
months.
## Trust points one way
The box authenticates with `~/.ssh/id_pull` to an unprivileged, dedicated
account on each source (`backup-pull`, or `arbret` on prd-arbret), authorised
with `restrict`. That account can read one directory and do nothing else — no
sudo, no pty, no forwarding. A compromised backup box cannot reach into
production.
## Addressing: names, never IPs
Sources are addressed by name. The job this replaced hardcoded spacey's IP; the
droplet was later rebuilt, the address was recycled to a stranger, and the
backup failed silently from 2025-12-01 while the directory listing still looked
healthy.
Two kinds of name are in play:
- **Tailnet members** (vipy, memos-box, …) → MagicDNS names. These require a
headscale ACL grant from `tag:small-backups-box` to the source's `:22`; without
it the box cannot even resolve the peer, let alone reach it.
- **spacey** is *not* a tailnet member — it is the headscale control server — so
its backup is pulled over the public internet via `headscale.contrapeso.xyz`,
which follows the host if the droplet is rebuilt.
## Retention here is the long tail
Sources keep a few days locally; this box keeps 90 (or whatever the source entry
says). Losing the source's local copy is expected.

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---
backup_store_dir: "{{ ansible_env.HOME }}/backups"
backup_store_ssh_key: "{{ ansible_env.HOME }}/.ssh/id_pull"
backup_store_on_calendar: "*-*-* 04:00:00"
# One entry per source. `retention_days` is the LONG tail; the source keeps its
# own short local retention.
# - name: headscale
# source: "backup-pull@headscale.contrapeso.xyz:/opt/backups/headscale/"
# retention_days: 90
backup_store_sources: []

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---
- name: Reload systemd for pull-backups
ansible.builtin.systemd:
daemon_reload: yes
become: yes

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---
- name: Assert backup_store sources are sane
ansible.builtin.assert:
that:
- backup_store_sources | length > 0
- backup_store_sources | map(attribute='name') | list | length == backup_store_sources | length
- backup_store_sources | map(attribute='source') | list | length == backup_store_sources | length
- backup_store_sources | map(attribute='retention_days') | list | length == backup_store_sources | length
fail_msg: "backup_store: every source needs name, source and retention_days"
quiet: true
- name: Ensure rsync is installed
ansible.builtin.apt:
name: rsync
state: present
update_cache: yes
cache_valid_time: 3600
become: yes
- name: Ensure the backup store directory exists
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ backup_store_dir }}"
state: directory
mode: '0700'
- name: Install the pull-backups script
ansible.builtin.template:
src: pull-backups.sh.j2
dest: /usr/local/bin/pull-backups.sh
owner: root
group: root
mode: '0755'
validate: "bash -n %s"
become: yes
- name: Install the pull-backups systemd units
ansible.builtin.template:
src: "pull-backups.{{ item }}.j2"
dest: "/etc/systemd/system/pull-backups.{{ item }}"
owner: root
group: root
mode: '0644'
loop: [service, timer]
become: yes
notify: Reload systemd for pull-backups
- name: Enable the pull-backups timer
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: pull-backups.timer
enabled: yes
state: started
daemon_reload: yes
become: yes

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[Unit]
Description=Pull encrypted backups from production
[Service]
Type=oneshot
User={{ ansible_user_id }}
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/pull-backups.sh
StandardOutput=journal
StandardError=journal
SyslogIdentifier=pull-backups

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Pull encrypted backups from production — managed by Ansible (roles/backup_store)
#
# Everything here is already ciphertext: this host only moves and expires files,
# and holds no key that can read them.
set -uo pipefail # deliberately NOT -e; see the loop below
SSH_KEY="{{ backup_store_ssh_key }}"
STORE="{{ backup_store_dir }}"
log() { echo "$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S') $*"; }
fail() { echo "$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S') ERROR: $*" >&2; failures=$((failures + 1)); }
failures=0
# One source failing must not stop the others. The whole point of this box is
# that a single dead host cannot silently take the rest of the backups with it —
# which is exactly how the laptop-based jobs failed unnoticed for nine months.
{% for src in backup_store_sources %}
# --- {{ src.name }} ---
pull_{{ src.name | replace('-', '_') }}() {
local dir="${STORE}/{{ src.name }}"
mkdir -p "$dir"
log "Pulling {{ src.name }} from {{ src.source }}..."
if rsync -az --timeout=120 \
-e "ssh -i $SSH_KEY -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new -o ConnectTimeout=15" \
"{{ src.source }}" "$dir/"; then
log " {{ src.name }}: ok ($(find "$dir" -maxdepth 1 -type f | wc -l) artefacts, $(du -sh "$dir" | cut -f1))"
else
fail "{{ src.name }}: rsync failed"
return 1
fi
log " {{ src.name }}: pruning older than {{ src.retention_days }} days"
find "$dir" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '{{ src.name }}_*' -mtime +{{ src.retention_days }} -delete
}
pull_{{ src.name | replace('-', '_') }} || true
{% endfor %}
if [ "$failures" -gt 0 ]; then
log "FAILED: $failures source(s) did not pull"
exit 1
fi
log "All sources pulled."

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[Unit]
Description=Daily offsite backup pull
[Timer]
OnCalendar={{ backup_store_on_calendar }}
Persistent=true
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target