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ansible: add site.yml, and rename the monitoring group off the host's name site.yml is a TABLE OF CONTENTS, not a second source of truth. It is 25 import_playbook: lines and comments - no `hosts:`, no `roles:`. Which hosts get what stays on the `hosts:` line inside each playbook, exactly where it already was; nothing moved. Every role is already wrapped in a thin playbook carrying its own `hosts:` line, so there is no roles-vs-playbooks split to reconcile: from here everything is a playbook. What it buys: What runs on a host? ansible-playbook site.yml --limit <host> --list-hosts Who gets thing Y? the `hosts:` line in Y's own playbook What is a host? ansible-inventory --graph Note --list-hosts, not --list-tasks: the latter prints every play regardless of --limit, so it will happily show you the bitcoin play under memos-box. Nine playbooks are deliberately excluded and the file names every one with a reason, so it accounts for all of them: the three infra/4xx monitoring plays (still assert on the removed Uptime Kuma credentials and fail immediately), 910_docker (says `hosts: managed`, but Docker is on 5 of 11 managed hosts and those 5 are exactly the ones that need it - running it installs Docker on the Bitcoin node and the hypervisor), two nodito one-shots, the Kuma notification setup, and two deliberate manual actions. Writing it surfaced an inventory collision. There is a HOST named `monitoring` in [vps] AND a group [monitoring], so Ansible warned and resolved `hosts: monitoring` to the host: [WARNING]: Found both group and host with same name: monitoring The group is renamed to [observability]; the host keeps its name. [caddy:children] and the two ntfy playbooks follow. Behaviour is unchanged - `hosts: monitoring` already resolved to the host - but the ambiguity is gone and the warning with it. Verified: inventory graph is warning-free, site.yml passes --syntax-check, and per-host play counts are identical before and after the rename. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 21:24:09 +02:00
---
# Everything, in the order it has to happen.
#
# This file is a TABLE OF CONTENTS, not a second source of truth. It says what
# runs and in what order. It does NOT say which hosts get what — that stays on
# the `hosts:` line inside each playbook, exactly where it is today. Nothing
# moves; this file only makes the set readable in one place.
#
# What runs on a host? ansible-playbook site.yml --limit <host> --list-hosts
# Who gets thing Y? the `hosts:` line in Y's own playbook
# What is a host? ansible-inventory --graph
#
# Run a slice with --limit, or run one playbook directly as before. Nothing here
# changes how any individual playbook behaves.
# ── Baseline: every managed machine ─────────────────────────────────────────
- import_playbook: infra/01_user_and_access_setup_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: infra/02_firewall_and_fail2ban_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: infra/900_install_rsync.yml
- import_playbook: infra/920_join_headscale_mesh.yml
monitoring: retire the Uptime-Kuma-era checks, add ZFS pool capacity Five things deprecated, each verified against the DEPLOYED script before being deleted rather than assumed superseded: infra/410_disk_usage_alerts.yml -> disk-usage check (infra/400) infra/420_system_healthcheck.yml -> liveness check (infra/400) infra/430_cpu_temp_alerts.yml -> cpu-temp check (infra/400) 32_zfs play 2 (monitoring half) -> zfs-health check (infra/400) 34_nut play 2 (entirely) -> ups-status check (infra/400) Nothing is lost by the swap. The old system_healthcheck.sh only computed uptime and pushed, which is exactly a liveness heartbeat. The old disk monitor was WEAKER than its replacement: it checked "/" alone at 80%, where the new one walks every real filesystem at 85%. Deleting the playbooks was not the hard part. The units they installed live on the hosts, enabled, and keep firing regardless of what the repo says - two of them were still pushing to uptime.contrapeso.xyz every 15 minutes across nine machines. A playbook deleted without a cleanup leaves its output running forever with nothing left to explain it. So infra/409_remove_legacy_monitoring stops, disables and removes the units, deletes /opt/{disk-monitoring, system-healthcheck,nodito-monitoring,zfs-monitoring}, and removes the orphaned hand-written ups-heartbeat.sh. It ends by grepping for any surviving Kuma reference and reporting it. Kept permanently and idempotent, so a rebuilt or restored host cannot quietly bring them back. A trap avoided: the monthly ZFS scrub lived INSIDE 32_zfs play 2. Deleting the play wholesale would have silently stopped scrubbing the pool - and an unscrubbed pool makes the health check meaningless, because it would have nothing true to report. That play is now scrub-only and check-runs ok=5 changed=0. ZFS pool capacity added as a sixth condition to the zfs-health check. `zpool status` reports a 95% full pool as perfectly ONLINE, so capacity has to be read separately with `zpool list` - and it is the failure you get warning of rather than the one you discover. Threshold 80%, because ZFS allocation degrades badly past roughly that and fragmentation is hard to undo. The pool is at 47%. Verified both directions: passes on the real pool, and a simulated 91% exits 1. Also fixed the waste recorded in c2de6db: the healthcheck role installed its dependencies once per CHECK rather than per HOST - 29 apt transactions estate-wide for a curl already present, and the slowest part of every deploy. It now deduplicates within a play run, and the redundant standalone daemon_reload is gone (the systemd task already does one). site.yml updated, which exposed that services/gatus was never in it. It now runs before the three registration playbooks, since registering endpoints against a Gatus that is not yet serving would simply fail. Verified: no legacy timer remains on any host; 83 endpoints, 83 UP, 0 DOWN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 10:18:57 +02:00
# Idempotent and kept permanently: guarantees a rebuilt or restored host cannot
# quietly bring the Uptime-Kuma-era monitoring back.
- import_playbook: infra/409_remove_legacy_monitoring.yml
# ── Monitoring ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Gatus first: the three plays below register endpoints with it, and registering
# against a host that is not serving yet would simply fail.
- import_playbook: services/gatus/deploy_gatus_playbook.yml
alerting: Signal via signal-cli-rest-api, and faster failure detection Three changes: detection windows tightened, a Signal transport deployed, and alerts attached to all 84 non-transport endpoints. ── Failing faster ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── The heartbeat is a TICKER, not a deadline: Gatus wakes every interval and asks "did anything arrive in the last interval", so real detection is 1-2x the window. And a window can only ever be as tight as the push frequency - which is why two checks moved rather than just having their numbers changed. liveness, cpu, ups, service-health, probes 16m -> 11m disk, zfs daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h backup store + pull job daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h DNS records 24h -> 6h backup dump 30h -> 26h backup-dump stays slow because the dump genuinely is daily. The store-side check catches the same fault within 6h by reading the source's dump timestamp out of the artefact filename, so 26h is a backstop rather than the primary signal. ── Thresholds differ by check type, deliberately ─────────────────────────── `failure-threshold` counts consecutive failures, but "consecutive" is a different amount of wall-clock time per check: a push endpoint produces one failure per heartbeat window, a pulled one per interval. The default of 3 would mean 33 minutes on an 11m heartbeat and over a day on a 7h one. More importantly the heartbeat window ALREADY encodes the tolerance - an 11m window on a 5-minute push is exactly "one missed push forgiven" - so stacking a threshold of 3 triples a tolerance that was already chosen. Hence: push/heartbeat endpoints failure-threshold 1 pulled, 5m (public) failure-threshold 3 (= 15 minutes) pulled, 6h/24h (dns, domain) failure-threshold 1 ── The Signal transport ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── roles/signal_api runs signal-cli-rest-api on the observability host, pinned by digest, MODE=native. It publishes NO PORTS. The API has no authentication of any kind - anything that reaches it can send messages as you and read your Signal. Gatus talks to it over a shared docker network by service name, which is also WHY the network exists: Gatus runs in a container, so the host's loopback is unreachable from it and a port published on 127.0.0.1 would not have worked. MODE=native and not json-rpc because this VPS has 464MB of RAM and already runs Gatus and Caddy. The json-rpc modes hold a resident JVM; native runs a binary per request, and alerts are rare enough that startup cost per alert is the right trade. Monitored - Gatus polls /v1/health over the same network path the alerts take, so it proves the delivery route rather than mere container liveness. Deliberately NOT backed up: the data directory holds Signal private keys and the recovery path is to link the device again from the phone. Neither the signal-api endpoint nor Gatus's self-check carries a Signal alert. If either is down, Signal is precisely what cannot deliver the alert. ── Four traps hit while linking, all now in the role README ──────────────── * /v1/qrcodelink is BROKEN in native mode - returns "no data to encode" while the binary itself emits a perfectly good URI. Not worked around by switching MODE, which would put a JVM in the path of every alert permanently. * The data dir must be owned by uid 1000, not root. A root-owned 0700 dir cannot be traversed by the container user, so linking silently never completes and /v1/accounts returns "Failed to read local accounts list". * `docker exec` runs as ROOT while the service runs as uid 1000, so without --config the account is written to /root/... on the container's ephemeral layer. It reports success and is destroyed on the next recreate. * The phone reporting "network error" was IPv6: chat.signal.org resolves to dualstack AAAA records first, the container has no IPv6 address, and this host's IPv6 path is broken - the same edge that 404'd the Go tarball. Fixed with a mounted gai.conf that prefers IPv4. Verified: provider loads (configuredProviders=[signal]), a test message was delivered and confirmed received, 84 endpoints carry alerts, 86 UP / 0 DOWN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 21:40:37 +02:00
# The Signal transport for Gatus alerts. Shares a docker network with Gatus and
# publishes no ports - the API has no authentication. Needs a one-time manual
# device link; see roles/signal_api/README.md.
- import_playbook: services/signal-api/deploy_signal_api_playbook.yml
monitoring: retire the Uptime-Kuma-era checks, add ZFS pool capacity Five things deprecated, each verified against the DEPLOYED script before being deleted rather than assumed superseded: infra/410_disk_usage_alerts.yml -> disk-usage check (infra/400) infra/420_system_healthcheck.yml -> liveness check (infra/400) infra/430_cpu_temp_alerts.yml -> cpu-temp check (infra/400) 32_zfs play 2 (monitoring half) -> zfs-health check (infra/400) 34_nut play 2 (entirely) -> ups-status check (infra/400) Nothing is lost by the swap. The old system_healthcheck.sh only computed uptime and pushed, which is exactly a liveness heartbeat. The old disk monitor was WEAKER than its replacement: it checked "/" alone at 80%, where the new one walks every real filesystem at 85%. Deleting the playbooks was not the hard part. The units they installed live on the hosts, enabled, and keep firing regardless of what the repo says - two of them were still pushing to uptime.contrapeso.xyz every 15 minutes across nine machines. A playbook deleted without a cleanup leaves its output running forever with nothing left to explain it. So infra/409_remove_legacy_monitoring stops, disables and removes the units, deletes /opt/{disk-monitoring, system-healthcheck,nodito-monitoring,zfs-monitoring}, and removes the orphaned hand-written ups-heartbeat.sh. It ends by grepping for any surviving Kuma reference and reporting it. Kept permanently and idempotent, so a rebuilt or restored host cannot quietly bring them back. A trap avoided: the monthly ZFS scrub lived INSIDE 32_zfs play 2. Deleting the play wholesale would have silently stopped scrubbing the pool - and an unscrubbed pool makes the health check meaningless, because it would have nothing true to report. That play is now scrub-only and check-runs ok=5 changed=0. ZFS pool capacity added as a sixth condition to the zfs-health check. `zpool status` reports a 95% full pool as perfectly ONLINE, so capacity has to be read separately with `zpool list` - and it is the failure you get warning of rather than the one you discover. Threshold 80%, because ZFS allocation degrades badly past roughly that and fragmentation is hard to undo. The pool is at 47%. Verified both directions: passes on the real pool, and a simulated 91% exits 1. Also fixed the waste recorded in c2de6db: the healthcheck role installed its dependencies once per CHECK rather than per HOST - 29 apt transactions estate-wide for a curl already present, and the slowest part of every deploy. It now deduplicates within a play run, and the redundant standalone daemon_reload is gone (the systemd task already does one). site.yml updated, which exposed that services/gatus was never in it. It now runs before the three registration playbooks, since registering endpoints against a Gatus that is not yet serving would simply fail. Verified: no legacy timer remains on any host; 83 endpoints, 83 UP, 0 DOWN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 10:18:57 +02:00
- import_playbook: infra/400_host_monitoring.yml
- import_playbook: infra/401_service_monitoring.yml
- import_playbook: infra/402_public_monitoring.yml
uptime kuma: remove every live reference, repoint the probes to Gatus Nothing in the repo pushes to, authenticates against, or is gated by Uptime Kuma any more. ── The sixth instance of the banner bug ──────────────────────────────────── memos had `Restart memos` guarded by `uptime_kuma_enabled`, because the deprecation banner was placed immediately above it and swept it in. It is a HANDLER, so every memos config change since 2026-09-11 applied to disk and silently never restarted the service. Ungated. That is the same failure found in forgejo-runner's self-assert, phoenixd's timer enable, mempool's three timer enables, fulcrum's restart handler and bitcoind's restart handler. Every guard was read and asked "monitoring or deployment?" before being deleted, which is the only reason this was caught. ── What was removed ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 30 uptime_kuma_enabled guards across 7 unconverted service playbooks, and the 29 Kuma monitor-creation tasks they gated (embedded Python that drove the Kuma API, temp credential files, cleanup) 7 dead uptime_kuma_api_url definitions 7 stale DEPRECATED banners uptime_kuma_enabled and subdomains.uptime_kuma from group_vars/all healthcheck_push_urls from the vault - 30 push tokens services/ntfy/setup_ntfy_uptime_kuma_notification.yml -> archive/ The explanatory comments in the six converted roles are KEPT on purpose. They record why a handler is ungated, and deleting the explanation invites someone to helpfully re-add the guard. ── The probes moved rather than died ─────────────────────────────────────── Eight per-service health checks were still pushing to Kuma. They are not superseded by infra/401: that answers "is the unit running", these answer "does the service actually respond" - an RPC call to bitcoind, a TCP connect to Fulcrum's Electrum port, an HTTP fetch from Mempool's backend. A process can be perfectly `active` and useless. So they were repointed, not deleted. Gatus external endpoints take a POST with a bearer token and success=true|false where Kuma took a GET with ?status=up, so report() now maps up/down to true/false internally and no call site changed. Registered by infra/403 as the `probe` group, one token per host. Two bugs fixed while in there: * forgejo-runner's check only ever reported SUCCESS - it exited before pushing when the runner was down, so a failure was invisible until the heartbeat window expired. Reporting the failure is the entire point of a check. * All six healthcheck .service units were mode 0644 and now carry a bearer token. They are 0600. Verified: 91 endpoints, 91 UP, 0 DOWN. Every probe triggered by hand and confirmed arriving. Zero Kuma URLs left in the vault, zero live references in any playbook or role. Still standing, deliberately: the Kuma container on watchtower, its Caddy vhost, and the uptime.contrapeso.xyz DNS record. Turning the service off is a separate decision from removing the code that talked to it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 10:30:28 +02:00
# Registers where the per-service probes report. The probes themselves are
# deployed by each service's own playbook further down; the endpoints must exist
# before the first push arrives.
- import_playbook: infra/403_service_probe_registration.yml
ansible: add site.yml, and rename the monitoring group off the host's name site.yml is a TABLE OF CONTENTS, not a second source of truth. It is 25 import_playbook: lines and comments - no `hosts:`, no `roles:`. Which hosts get what stays on the `hosts:` line inside each playbook, exactly where it already was; nothing moved. Every role is already wrapped in a thin playbook carrying its own `hosts:` line, so there is no roles-vs-playbooks split to reconcile: from here everything is a playbook. What it buys: What runs on a host? ansible-playbook site.yml --limit <host> --list-hosts Who gets thing Y? the `hosts:` line in Y's own playbook What is a host? ansible-inventory --graph Note --list-hosts, not --list-tasks: the latter prints every play regardless of --limit, so it will happily show you the bitcoin play under memos-box. Nine playbooks are deliberately excluded and the file names every one with a reason, so it accounts for all of them: the three infra/4xx monitoring plays (still assert on the removed Uptime Kuma credentials and fail immediately), 910_docker (says `hosts: managed`, but Docker is on 5 of 11 managed hosts and those 5 are exactly the ones that need it - running it installs Docker on the Bitcoin node and the hypervisor), two nodito one-shots, the Kuma notification setup, and two deliberate manual actions. Writing it surfaced an inventory collision. There is a HOST named `monitoring` in [vps] AND a group [monitoring], so Ansible warned and resolved `hosts: monitoring` to the host: [WARNING]: Found both group and host with same name: monitoring The group is renamed to [observability]; the host keeps its name. [caddy:children] and the two ntfy playbooks follow. Behaviour is unchanged - `hosts: monitoring` already resolved to the host - but the ambiguity is gone and the warning with it. Verified: inventory graph is warning-free, site.yml passes --syntax-check, and per-host play counts are identical before and after the rename. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 21:24:09 +02:00
# 910_docker says `hosts: managed`, but only 5 of 11 managed hosts have or need
# Docker. Left out until it has a [docker] group — see the note in PLAN_7.
# ── The hypervisor ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- import_playbook: infra/nodito/31_proxmox_community_repos_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: infra/nodito/32_zfs_pool_setup_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: infra/nodito/34_nut_ups_setup_playbook.yml
# ── Reverse proxy, before anything that registers a vhost ───────────────────
- import_playbook: services/caddy_playbook.yml
# ── Services ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- import_playbook: services/bitcoin-knots/deploy_bitcoin_knots_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/fulcrum/deploy_fulcrum_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/datum-gateway/deploy_datum_gateway_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/mempool/deploy_mempool_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/memos/deploy_memos_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/forgejo-runner/deploy_forgejo_runner_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/phoenixd/deploy_phoenixd_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/headscale/deploy_headscale_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/vaultwarden/deploy_vaultwarden_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/forgejo/deploy_forgejo_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/lnbits/deploy_lnbits_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/ntfy-emergency-app/deploy_ntfy_emergency_app_playbook.yml
- import_playbook: services/personal-blog/deploy_personal_blog_playbook.yml
# ── Backups: each source dumps itself, the box pulls ────────────────────────
- import_playbook: services/headscale/setup_backup_headscale.yml
- import_playbook: services/vaultwarden/setup_backup_vaultwarden.yml
- import_playbook: services/forgejo/setup_backup_forgejo.yml
- import_playbook: services/lnbits/setup_backup_lnbits.yml
- import_playbook: services/memos/setup_backup_memos.yml
- import_playbook: playbooks/backups.yml
# Deliberately not here. Every playbook in the repo is either imported above or
# listed below, so this file accounts for all of them:
#
# infra/910_docker_playbook.yml says `hosts: managed`, but Docker is on 5
# of 11 managed hosts and those 5 are exactly
# the ones that need it. Running it would
# install Docker on the Bitcoin node and the
# hypervisor. Needs a [docker] group first.
#
# infra/nodito/30_proxmox_bootstrap one-shot: bare-metal bootstrap, run once
# infra/nodito/33_..._cloud_template one-shot: builds the VM template
#
#
# services/vaultwarden/disable_ deliberate manual actions, not convergence
# vaultwarden_sign_ups_playbook.yml
# services/personal-blog/setup_
# deploy_alias_lapy.yml
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