personal_infra/ansible/roles/gatus/tasks/main.yml

---
# import, never include: dynamic includes are opaque to --list-tasks, which is
# the primary verification tool in this repo.
- ansible.builtin.import_tasks: configure.yml
- ansible.builtin.import_tasks: service.yml
gatus: deploy on prd-monitoring, behind Caddy basic auth First step of replacing Uptime Kuma and ntfy. Gatus runs on the new observability VPS, fronted by Caddy at status.contrapeso.xyz. Deployed as the upstream container image, not built from source. The role did build from source first - their Dockerfile is a bare `CGO_ENABLED=0 go build`, the Vue dashboard is compiled in via `//go:embed static` in web/static.go, and CGO can stay off because the sqlite driver is pure-Go modernc.org/sqlite - but that produces a binary upstream never ran, and it meant compiling the AWS SDK and gRPC on the smallest box in the estate. That load was heavy enough that unrelated Ansible tasks timed out while it ran. The cost of the container is a daemon on the machine whose job is to notice when everything else breaks; that trade is made deliberately and is written down in the role README. Pinned by DIGEST, not tag. A tag is mutable - v5.36.0 can be repushed - so pinning it alone is a weaker promise than it looks: gatus_image: "ghcr.io/twin/gatus@sha256:c5f210d0..." `docker compose pull` now either fetches exactly the reviewed image or fails. gatus_version is kept beside it only so a human can read the release; the two move together. The image is FROM scratch, so it has no /etc/passwd and its default user is root. The container runs as 10001:10001 with the host data dir owned to match, plus read_only, cap_drop ALL, and no-new-privileges. NET_RAW is added back only when gatus_allow_icmp, so the capability for icmp:// checks is a visible grant rather than something inherited from running as root. Config is a DIRECTORY, not a file. Gatus merges every .yaml under GATUS_CONFIG_PATH - maps deep-merge, lists append - so the role owns 00-base.yaml (web, storage, ui, alerting, security) and each service will drop its own file into endpoints/, the same shape as caddy_site. A primitive defined twice is ambiguous and upstream refuses it, so anything that is not a list lives in the base file and nowhere else. Two bugs the deploy caught: Gatus panics on a config with no endpoints ("configuration should contain at least one endpoint or suite"), so "install now, add endpoints later" is not a valid state. The role ships endpoints/00-self.yaml checking its own /health. Less circular than it looks: it proves the directory merged, the listener serves, and storage accepted a write. * web.address was carried over from the systemd design as 127.0.0.1. Inside a container that is the CONTAINER's loopback, which docker-proxy cannot reach - gatus came up healthy, self-check passing, while every connection to the published port was refused. It now always binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container; the isolation comes from publishing to 127.0.0.1 on the host. Auth is done at the edge, NOT with Gatus's own security.basic. Reading api/api.go, that middleware protects exactly four routes - the statuses endpoints. Everything else is registered on the unprotected router, including /api/v1/config, every badge, and /api/v1/endpoints/:key/uptimes/:duration and .../response-times/:duration/history, which return real data to anyone who can guess a key ("<group>_<name>"). Verified against the live instance: all seven routes returned 200 unauthenticated, and /uptimes/24h returned "1.000000". So the vhost uses caddy_site_body with a path carve-out rather than caddy_site_basic_auth, which has no way to exempt a path. The external-endpoint push API must NOT sit behind basic auth: it authenticates with `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, and basic auth wants the same header. It is not unauthenticated - the handler 401s on a missing prefix, an empty token, or a token that does not match that endpoint's own. Verified end to end. All seven previously-open routes now 401. The push path distinguishes cleanly: POST with no auth gets Gatus's own "invalid Authorization header" with NO WWW-Authenticate; POST with a bogus Bearer gets 404 (key looked up, no external endpoints yet); GET on the same path gets Caddy's 401 with WWW-Authenticate: Basic, so the exemption is scoped to POST alone. The self-check still passes because it polls localhost inside the container and never traverses Caddy. The host itself was rebuilt from scratch: 01 (ok=9 changed=8), 02 (ok=12 changed=6), 910_docker (--limit, since that playbook still wrongly claims all of `managed` needs Docker), caddy (ok=13 changed=8), gatus (ok=18 changed=2). Not done here: gatus_alerting is still {} - valid, and every condition is evaluated and recorded, there is just nowhere to shout until a provider is chosen to replace ntfy. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> 2026-09-13 22:29:03 +02:00			`---`
			`# import, never include: dynamic includes are opaque to --list-tasks, which is`
			`# the primary verification tool in this repo.`
			`- ansible.builtin.import_tasks: configure.yml`
			`- ansible.builtin.import_tasks: service.yml`