personal_infra/ansible/playbooks/backups.yml

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2026-09-12 16:02:00 +02:00
- name: Configure the offsite backup pull
hosts: backup_store
gather_facts: yes
tasks:
- name: Ensure the box pulls every source on a timer
ansible.builtin.include_role:
name: backup_store
vars:
backups: monitor both the dump and the pull, per source Twelve endpoints in two groups, because they answer different questions and fail for different reasons: backup-dump_<svc> pushed by the SOURCE right after its dump runs backup-store_<svc> pushed by the BOX at 05:30, per source backup-store_pull-job pushed by the BOX, about the box itself The store alone could catch almost everything, because the artefact filename carries the source's dump timestamp - a source whose timer died still pulls "ok" forever, but the timestamp gives it away. What the source side adds is LATENCY and DIAGNOSIS: the store only learns at the next 04:00 pull, and it cannot tell you whether the dump broke or the pull did. pull-job is separate from the per-source checks because it is a LEADING indicator where those are lagging ones. A disabled pull timer, a failed pull job, or a filling disk are all visible immediately, while the per-source checks only fire once an artefact is >26h stale - about a day later. Disable the timer at 10:00 and every source stays green until tomorrow; pull-job goes red this morning and names the cause instead of showing six stale sources. Frequencies: dumps 02:00-02:30 staggered, pull 04:00, verification 05:30, all daily and Persistent. 26h staleness decides red; a 30h Gatus heartbeat catches the verification itself having stopped, so a dead check-backups.timer cannot hide a stale backup. arbret has no dump endpoint: prd-arbret is in [arbret], which `managed` deliberately excludes, so nothing of ours runs there. Store-checked only. check-backups.sh was manual-only; it now runs on a timer and reports per source rather than only printing. The human-readable report is unchanged. A SERIOUS bug introduced and fixed in this change, recorded because the shape is easy to repeat: the reporting hook was added to backup.sh as a second `trap ... EXIT`. Bash REPLACES the EXIT handler rather than adding to it, so that silently deleted the trap which restarts the stopped service - the one the script's own comment calls "the point", and the bug the role was written to eliminate. Every backup then stopped its service and left it stopped. It took forgejo, lnbits, headscale and memos down for several minutes each, and nothing caught it: the dumps exit 0, the artefacts are correct, the deploy reports failed=0, and liveness only proves the HOST is up. There is now ONE EXIT handler doing both jobs, armed BEFORE the stop so a failure during the stop still restarts. Verified by rendering both variants, asserting exactly one EXIT trap in each, and simulating a mid-way failure to confirm the restart fires. Verified: all 12 endpoints UP; six sources pulled cleanly (arbret 31M, headscale 198K, memos 7.8M, vaultwarden 2.1M, lnbits 30M, forgejo 2.6G), store 16% full, "RESULT: all checks passed". Known gaps, deliberately not closed here: * `yell` warnings - disk 75-90%, an artefact under half the previous size, retention not pruning - never reach Gatus, because a push is binary. * Nothing verifies a backed-up service came back UP. That is the gap that let the trap bug run unnoticed, and it is what the next change addresses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 09:22:12 +02:00
# check-backups.sh reports one result per source plus one for the store
# itself, so it needs the collection URL and appends each key.
backup_store_check_push_base: "https://{{ subdomains.gatus }}.{{ root_domain }}/api/v1/endpoints"
backup_store_check_push_token: "{{ gatus_push_tokens[inventory_hostname] }}"
2026-09-12 16:02:00 +02:00
backup_store_sources:
- name: arbret
source: "arbret@prd-arbret:/opt/arbret/backups/"
retention_days: 90
- name: headscale
source: "backup-pull@headscale.contrapeso.xyz:/opt/backups/headscale/"
retention_days: 90
2026-09-12 16:20:42 +02:00
- name: memos
source: "backup-pull@memos-box:/opt/backups/memos/"
retention_days: 90
- name: vaultwarden
source: "backup-pull@prd-vipy:/opt/backups/vaultwarden/"
retention_days: 90
- name: lnbits
source: "backup-pull@prd-vipy:/opt/backups/lnbits/"
retention_days: 90
- name: forgejo
source: "backup-pull@prd-vipy:/opt/backups/forgejo/"
retention_days: 14
backups: monitor both the dump and the pull, per source Twelve endpoints in two groups, because they answer different questions and fail for different reasons: backup-dump_<svc> pushed by the SOURCE right after its dump runs backup-store_<svc> pushed by the BOX at 05:30, per source backup-store_pull-job pushed by the BOX, about the box itself The store alone could catch almost everything, because the artefact filename carries the source's dump timestamp - a source whose timer died still pulls "ok" forever, but the timestamp gives it away. What the source side adds is LATENCY and DIAGNOSIS: the store only learns at the next 04:00 pull, and it cannot tell you whether the dump broke or the pull did. pull-job is separate from the per-source checks because it is a LEADING indicator where those are lagging ones. A disabled pull timer, a failed pull job, or a filling disk are all visible immediately, while the per-source checks only fire once an artefact is >26h stale - about a day later. Disable the timer at 10:00 and every source stays green until tomorrow; pull-job goes red this morning and names the cause instead of showing six stale sources. Frequencies: dumps 02:00-02:30 staggered, pull 04:00, verification 05:30, all daily and Persistent. 26h staleness decides red; a 30h Gatus heartbeat catches the verification itself having stopped, so a dead check-backups.timer cannot hide a stale backup. arbret has no dump endpoint: prd-arbret is in [arbret], which `managed` deliberately excludes, so nothing of ours runs there. Store-checked only. check-backups.sh was manual-only; it now runs on a timer and reports per source rather than only printing. The human-readable report is unchanged. A SERIOUS bug introduced and fixed in this change, recorded because the shape is easy to repeat: the reporting hook was added to backup.sh as a second `trap ... EXIT`. Bash REPLACES the EXIT handler rather than adding to it, so that silently deleted the trap which restarts the stopped service - the one the script's own comment calls "the point", and the bug the role was written to eliminate. Every backup then stopped its service and left it stopped. It took forgejo, lnbits, headscale and memos down for several minutes each, and nothing caught it: the dumps exit 0, the artefacts are correct, the deploy reports failed=0, and liveness only proves the HOST is up. There is now ONE EXIT handler doing both jobs, armed BEFORE the stop so a failure during the stop still restarts. Verified by rendering both variants, asserting exactly one EXIT trap in each, and simulating a mid-way failure to confirm the restart fires. Verified: all 12 endpoints UP; six sources pulled cleanly (arbret 31M, headscale 198K, memos 7.8M, vaultwarden 2.1M, lnbits 30M, forgejo 2.6G), store 16% full, "RESULT: all checks passed". Known gaps, deliberately not closed here: * `yell` warnings - disk 75-90%, an artefact under half the previous size, retention not pruning - never reach Gatus, because a push is binary. * Nothing verifies a backed-up service came back UP. That is the gap that let the trap bug run unnoticed, and it is what the next change addresses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 09:22:12 +02:00
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Register the backup checks with Gatus.
#
# Two groups on purpose, because they answer different questions and fail for
# different reasons:
#
# backup-dump did the SOURCE produce an artefact? Pushed by each dump right
# after it runs, so a broken dump is visible within minutes.
# backup-store did it ARRIVE, is it fresh, non-zero, plausibly sized, and is
# retention pruning? Pushed by check-backups.sh at 05:30.
#
# The store alone could catch almost everything, because the artefact filename
# carries the source's dump timestamp - a source whose timer died still pulls
# "ok" forever, but the timestamp gives it away. What the source side adds is
# LATENCY and DIAGNOSIS: the store only learns at the next 04:00 pull, and it
# cannot tell you whether the dump broke or the pull did.
#
# arbret has no dump endpoint: prd-arbret lives in [arbret], which `managed`
# deliberately excludes, so nothing of ours runs there. It is store-checked only.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- name: Register the backup checks with Gatus
hosts: observability
become: yes
vars:
# Sources we deploy the dump for, and the host each one runs on.
dump_sources:
- {name: headscale, host: spacey}
- {name: memos, host: memos_box_local}
- {name: vaultwarden, host: vipy}
- {name: lnbits, host: vipy}
- {name: forgejo, host: vipy}
store_sources: [arbret, headscale, memos, vaultwarden, lnbits, forgejo]
tasks:
alerting: Signal via signal-cli-rest-api, and faster failure detection Three changes: detection windows tightened, a Signal transport deployed, and alerts attached to all 84 non-transport endpoints. ── Failing faster ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── The heartbeat is a TICKER, not a deadline: Gatus wakes every interval and asks "did anything arrive in the last interval", so real detection is 1-2x the window. And a window can only ever be as tight as the push frequency - which is why two checks moved rather than just having their numbers changed. liveness, cpu, ups, service-health, probes 16m -> 11m disk, zfs daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h backup store + pull job daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h DNS records 24h -> 6h backup dump 30h -> 26h backup-dump stays slow because the dump genuinely is daily. The store-side check catches the same fault within 6h by reading the source's dump timestamp out of the artefact filename, so 26h is a backstop rather than the primary signal. ── Thresholds differ by check type, deliberately ─────────────────────────── `failure-threshold` counts consecutive failures, but "consecutive" is a different amount of wall-clock time per check: a push endpoint produces one failure per heartbeat window, a pulled one per interval. The default of 3 would mean 33 minutes on an 11m heartbeat and over a day on a 7h one. More importantly the heartbeat window ALREADY encodes the tolerance - an 11m window on a 5-minute push is exactly "one missed push forgiven" - so stacking a threshold of 3 triples a tolerance that was already chosen. Hence: push/heartbeat endpoints failure-threshold 1 pulled, 5m (public) failure-threshold 3 (= 15 minutes) pulled, 6h/24h (dns, domain) failure-threshold 1 ── The Signal transport ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── roles/signal_api runs signal-cli-rest-api on the observability host, pinned by digest, MODE=native. It publishes NO PORTS. The API has no authentication of any kind - anything that reaches it can send messages as you and read your Signal. Gatus talks to it over a shared docker network by service name, which is also WHY the network exists: Gatus runs in a container, so the host's loopback is unreachable from it and a port published on 127.0.0.1 would not have worked. MODE=native and not json-rpc because this VPS has 464MB of RAM and already runs Gatus and Caddy. The json-rpc modes hold a resident JVM; native runs a binary per request, and alerts are rare enough that startup cost per alert is the right trade. Monitored - Gatus polls /v1/health over the same network path the alerts take, so it proves the delivery route rather than mere container liveness. Deliberately NOT backed up: the data directory holds Signal private keys and the recovery path is to link the device again from the phone. Neither the signal-api endpoint nor Gatus's self-check carries a Signal alert. If either is down, Signal is precisely what cannot deliver the alert. ── Four traps hit while linking, all now in the role README ──────────────── * /v1/qrcodelink is BROKEN in native mode - returns "no data to encode" while the binary itself emits a perfectly good URI. Not worked around by switching MODE, which would put a JVM in the path of every alert permanently. * The data dir must be owned by uid 1000, not root. A root-owned 0700 dir cannot be traversed by the container user, so linking silently never completes and /v1/accounts returns "Failed to read local accounts list". * `docker exec` runs as ROOT while the service runs as uid 1000, so without --config the account is written to /root/... on the container's ephemeral layer. It reports success and is destroyed on the next recreate. * The phone reporting "network error" was IPv6: chat.signal.org resolves to dualstack AAAA records first, the container has no IPv6 address, and this host's IPv6 path is broken - the same edge that 404'd the Go tarball. Fixed with a mounted gai.conf that prefers IPv4. Verified: provider loads (configuredProviders=[signal]), a test message was delivered and confirmed received, 84 endpoints carry alerts, 86 UP / 0 DOWN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 21:40:37 +02:00
# 26h, not 7h: the DUMP is genuinely daily, so the window cannot be tighter
# than a day plus slack. The store-side check catches the same fault within
# 6h by reading the artefact's dump timestamp out of the filename, so this is
# the slow backstop rather than the primary signal.
backups: monitor both the dump and the pull, per source Twelve endpoints in two groups, because they answer different questions and fail for different reasons: backup-dump_<svc> pushed by the SOURCE right after its dump runs backup-store_<svc> pushed by the BOX at 05:30, per source backup-store_pull-job pushed by the BOX, about the box itself The store alone could catch almost everything, because the artefact filename carries the source's dump timestamp - a source whose timer died still pulls "ok" forever, but the timestamp gives it away. What the source side adds is LATENCY and DIAGNOSIS: the store only learns at the next 04:00 pull, and it cannot tell you whether the dump broke or the pull did. pull-job is separate from the per-source checks because it is a LEADING indicator where those are lagging ones. A disabled pull timer, a failed pull job, or a filling disk are all visible immediately, while the per-source checks only fire once an artefact is >26h stale - about a day later. Disable the timer at 10:00 and every source stays green until tomorrow; pull-job goes red this morning and names the cause instead of showing six stale sources. Frequencies: dumps 02:00-02:30 staggered, pull 04:00, verification 05:30, all daily and Persistent. 26h staleness decides red; a 30h Gatus heartbeat catches the verification itself having stopped, so a dead check-backups.timer cannot hide a stale backup. arbret has no dump endpoint: prd-arbret is in [arbret], which `managed` deliberately excludes, so nothing of ours runs there. Store-checked only. check-backups.sh was manual-only; it now runs on a timer and reports per source rather than only printing. The human-readable report is unchanged. A SERIOUS bug introduced and fixed in this change, recorded because the shape is easy to repeat: the reporting hook was added to backup.sh as a second `trap ... EXIT`. Bash REPLACES the EXIT handler rather than adding to it, so that silently deleted the trap which restarts the stopped service - the one the script's own comment calls "the point", and the bug the role was written to eliminate. Every backup then stopped its service and left it stopped. It took forgejo, lnbits, headscale and memos down for several minutes each, and nothing caught it: the dumps exit 0, the artefacts are correct, the deploy reports failed=0, and liveness only proves the HOST is up. There is now ONE EXIT handler doing both jobs, armed BEFORE the stop so a failure during the stop still restarts. Verified by rendering both variants, asserting exactly one EXIT trap in each, and simulating a mid-way failure to confirm the restart fires. Verified: all 12 endpoints UP; six sources pulled cleanly (arbret 31M, headscale 198K, memos 7.8M, vaultwarden 2.1M, lnbits 30M, forgejo 2.6G), store 16% full, "RESULT: all checks passed". Known gaps, deliberately not closed here: * `yell` warnings - disk 75-90%, an artefact under half the previous size, retention not pruning - never reach Gatus, because a push is binary. * Nothing verifies a backed-up service came back UP. That is the gap that let the trap bug run unnoticed, and it is what the next change addresses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 09:22:12 +02:00
- name: Build the dump endpoint list
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
dump_endpoints: "{{ dump_endpoints | default([]) + [{
'name': item.name,
'group': 'backup-dump',
'token': gatus_push_tokens[item.host],
alerting: Signal via signal-cli-rest-api, and faster failure detection Three changes: detection windows tightened, a Signal transport deployed, and alerts attached to all 84 non-transport endpoints. ── Failing faster ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── The heartbeat is a TICKER, not a deadline: Gatus wakes every interval and asks "did anything arrive in the last interval", so real detection is 1-2x the window. And a window can only ever be as tight as the push frequency - which is why two checks moved rather than just having their numbers changed. liveness, cpu, ups, service-health, probes 16m -> 11m disk, zfs daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h backup store + pull job daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h DNS records 24h -> 6h backup dump 30h -> 26h backup-dump stays slow because the dump genuinely is daily. The store-side check catches the same fault within 6h by reading the source's dump timestamp out of the artefact filename, so 26h is a backstop rather than the primary signal. ── Thresholds differ by check type, deliberately ─────────────────────────── `failure-threshold` counts consecutive failures, but "consecutive" is a different amount of wall-clock time per check: a push endpoint produces one failure per heartbeat window, a pulled one per interval. The default of 3 would mean 33 minutes on an 11m heartbeat and over a day on a 7h one. More importantly the heartbeat window ALREADY encodes the tolerance - an 11m window on a 5-minute push is exactly "one missed push forgiven" - so stacking a threshold of 3 triples a tolerance that was already chosen. Hence: push/heartbeat endpoints failure-threshold 1 pulled, 5m (public) failure-threshold 3 (= 15 minutes) pulled, 6h/24h (dns, domain) failure-threshold 1 ── The Signal transport ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── roles/signal_api runs signal-cli-rest-api on the observability host, pinned by digest, MODE=native. It publishes NO PORTS. The API has no authentication of any kind - anything that reaches it can send messages as you and read your Signal. Gatus talks to it over a shared docker network by service name, which is also WHY the network exists: Gatus runs in a container, so the host's loopback is unreachable from it and a port published on 127.0.0.1 would not have worked. MODE=native and not json-rpc because this VPS has 464MB of RAM and already runs Gatus and Caddy. The json-rpc modes hold a resident JVM; native runs a binary per request, and alerts are rare enough that startup cost per alert is the right trade. Monitored - Gatus polls /v1/health over the same network path the alerts take, so it proves the delivery route rather than mere container liveness. Deliberately NOT backed up: the data directory holds Signal private keys and the recovery path is to link the device again from the phone. Neither the signal-api endpoint nor Gatus's self-check carries a Signal alert. If either is down, Signal is precisely what cannot deliver the alert. ── Four traps hit while linking, all now in the role README ──────────────── * /v1/qrcodelink is BROKEN in native mode - returns "no data to encode" while the binary itself emits a perfectly good URI. Not worked around by switching MODE, which would put a JVM in the path of every alert permanently. * The data dir must be owned by uid 1000, not root. A root-owned 0700 dir cannot be traversed by the container user, so linking silently never completes and /v1/accounts returns "Failed to read local accounts list". * `docker exec` runs as ROOT while the service runs as uid 1000, so without --config the account is written to /root/... on the container's ephemeral layer. It reports success and is destroyed on the next recreate. * The phone reporting "network error" was IPv6: chat.signal.org resolves to dualstack AAAA records first, the container has no IPv6 address, and this host's IPv6 path is broken - the same edge that 404'd the Go tarball. Fixed with a mounted gai.conf that prefers IPv4. Verified: provider loads (configuredProviders=[signal]), a test message was delivered and confirmed received, 84 endpoints carry alerts, 86 UP / 0 DOWN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 21:40:37 +02:00
'heartbeat': '26h'}] }}"
backups: monitor both the dump and the pull, per source Twelve endpoints in two groups, because they answer different questions and fail for different reasons: backup-dump_<svc> pushed by the SOURCE right after its dump runs backup-store_<svc> pushed by the BOX at 05:30, per source backup-store_pull-job pushed by the BOX, about the box itself The store alone could catch almost everything, because the artefact filename carries the source's dump timestamp - a source whose timer died still pulls "ok" forever, but the timestamp gives it away. What the source side adds is LATENCY and DIAGNOSIS: the store only learns at the next 04:00 pull, and it cannot tell you whether the dump broke or the pull did. pull-job is separate from the per-source checks because it is a LEADING indicator where those are lagging ones. A disabled pull timer, a failed pull job, or a filling disk are all visible immediately, while the per-source checks only fire once an artefact is >26h stale - about a day later. Disable the timer at 10:00 and every source stays green until tomorrow; pull-job goes red this morning and names the cause instead of showing six stale sources. Frequencies: dumps 02:00-02:30 staggered, pull 04:00, verification 05:30, all daily and Persistent. 26h staleness decides red; a 30h Gatus heartbeat catches the verification itself having stopped, so a dead check-backups.timer cannot hide a stale backup. arbret has no dump endpoint: prd-arbret is in [arbret], which `managed` deliberately excludes, so nothing of ours runs there. Store-checked only. check-backups.sh was manual-only; it now runs on a timer and reports per source rather than only printing. The human-readable report is unchanged. A SERIOUS bug introduced and fixed in this change, recorded because the shape is easy to repeat: the reporting hook was added to backup.sh as a second `trap ... EXIT`. Bash REPLACES the EXIT handler rather than adding to it, so that silently deleted the trap which restarts the stopped service - the one the script's own comment calls "the point", and the bug the role was written to eliminate. Every backup then stopped its service and left it stopped. It took forgejo, lnbits, headscale and memos down for several minutes each, and nothing caught it: the dumps exit 0, the artefacts are correct, the deploy reports failed=0, and liveness only proves the HOST is up. There is now ONE EXIT handler doing both jobs, armed BEFORE the stop so a failure during the stop still restarts. Verified by rendering both variants, asserting exactly one EXIT trap in each, and simulating a mid-way failure to confirm the restart fires. Verified: all 12 endpoints UP; six sources pulled cleanly (arbret 31M, headscale 198K, memos 7.8M, vaultwarden 2.1M, lnbits 30M, forgejo 2.6G), store 16% full, "RESULT: all checks passed". Known gaps, deliberately not closed here: * `yell` warnings - disk 75-90%, an artefact under half the previous size, retention not pruning - never reach Gatus, because a push is binary. * Nothing verifies a backed-up service came back UP. That is the gap that let the trap bug run unnoticed, and it is what the next change addresses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 09:22:12 +02:00
loop: "{{ dump_sources }}"
- name: Build the store endpoint list
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
store_endpoints: "{{ store_endpoints | default([]) + [{
'name': item,
'group': 'backup-store',
'token': gatus_push_tokens['small_backups_local'],
alerting: Signal via signal-cli-rest-api, and faster failure detection Three changes: detection windows tightened, a Signal transport deployed, and alerts attached to all 84 non-transport endpoints. ── Failing faster ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── The heartbeat is a TICKER, not a deadline: Gatus wakes every interval and asks "did anything arrive in the last interval", so real detection is 1-2x the window. And a window can only ever be as tight as the push frequency - which is why two checks moved rather than just having their numbers changed. liveness, cpu, ups, service-health, probes 16m -> 11m disk, zfs daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h backup store + pull job daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h DNS records 24h -> 6h backup dump 30h -> 26h backup-dump stays slow because the dump genuinely is daily. The store-side check catches the same fault within 6h by reading the source's dump timestamp out of the artefact filename, so 26h is a backstop rather than the primary signal. ── Thresholds differ by check type, deliberately ─────────────────────────── `failure-threshold` counts consecutive failures, but "consecutive" is a different amount of wall-clock time per check: a push endpoint produces one failure per heartbeat window, a pulled one per interval. The default of 3 would mean 33 minutes on an 11m heartbeat and over a day on a 7h one. More importantly the heartbeat window ALREADY encodes the tolerance - an 11m window on a 5-minute push is exactly "one missed push forgiven" - so stacking a threshold of 3 triples a tolerance that was already chosen. Hence: push/heartbeat endpoints failure-threshold 1 pulled, 5m (public) failure-threshold 3 (= 15 minutes) pulled, 6h/24h (dns, domain) failure-threshold 1 ── The Signal transport ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── roles/signal_api runs signal-cli-rest-api on the observability host, pinned by digest, MODE=native. It publishes NO PORTS. The API has no authentication of any kind - anything that reaches it can send messages as you and read your Signal. Gatus talks to it over a shared docker network by service name, which is also WHY the network exists: Gatus runs in a container, so the host's loopback is unreachable from it and a port published on 127.0.0.1 would not have worked. MODE=native and not json-rpc because this VPS has 464MB of RAM and already runs Gatus and Caddy. The json-rpc modes hold a resident JVM; native runs a binary per request, and alerts are rare enough that startup cost per alert is the right trade. Monitored - Gatus polls /v1/health over the same network path the alerts take, so it proves the delivery route rather than mere container liveness. Deliberately NOT backed up: the data directory holds Signal private keys and the recovery path is to link the device again from the phone. Neither the signal-api endpoint nor Gatus's self-check carries a Signal alert. If either is down, Signal is precisely what cannot deliver the alert. ── Four traps hit while linking, all now in the role README ──────────────── * /v1/qrcodelink is BROKEN in native mode - returns "no data to encode" while the binary itself emits a perfectly good URI. Not worked around by switching MODE, which would put a JVM in the path of every alert permanently. * The data dir must be owned by uid 1000, not root. A root-owned 0700 dir cannot be traversed by the container user, so linking silently never completes and /v1/accounts returns "Failed to read local accounts list". * `docker exec` runs as ROOT while the service runs as uid 1000, so without --config the account is written to /root/... on the container's ephemeral layer. It reports success and is destroyed on the next recreate. * The phone reporting "network error" was IPv6: chat.signal.org resolves to dualstack AAAA records first, the container has no IPv6 address, and this host's IPv6 path is broken - the same edge that 404'd the Go tarball. Fixed with a mounted gai.conf that prefers IPv4. Verified: provider loads (configuredProviders=[signal]), a test message was delivered and confirmed received, 84 endpoints carry alerts, 86 UP / 0 DOWN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 21:40:37 +02:00
'heartbeat': '7h'}] }}"
backups: monitor both the dump and the pull, per source Twelve endpoints in two groups, because they answer different questions and fail for different reasons: backup-dump_<svc> pushed by the SOURCE right after its dump runs backup-store_<svc> pushed by the BOX at 05:30, per source backup-store_pull-job pushed by the BOX, about the box itself The store alone could catch almost everything, because the artefact filename carries the source's dump timestamp - a source whose timer died still pulls "ok" forever, but the timestamp gives it away. What the source side adds is LATENCY and DIAGNOSIS: the store only learns at the next 04:00 pull, and it cannot tell you whether the dump broke or the pull did. pull-job is separate from the per-source checks because it is a LEADING indicator where those are lagging ones. A disabled pull timer, a failed pull job, or a filling disk are all visible immediately, while the per-source checks only fire once an artefact is >26h stale - about a day later. Disable the timer at 10:00 and every source stays green until tomorrow; pull-job goes red this morning and names the cause instead of showing six stale sources. Frequencies: dumps 02:00-02:30 staggered, pull 04:00, verification 05:30, all daily and Persistent. 26h staleness decides red; a 30h Gatus heartbeat catches the verification itself having stopped, so a dead check-backups.timer cannot hide a stale backup. arbret has no dump endpoint: prd-arbret is in [arbret], which `managed` deliberately excludes, so nothing of ours runs there. Store-checked only. check-backups.sh was manual-only; it now runs on a timer and reports per source rather than only printing. The human-readable report is unchanged. A SERIOUS bug introduced and fixed in this change, recorded because the shape is easy to repeat: the reporting hook was added to backup.sh as a second `trap ... EXIT`. Bash REPLACES the EXIT handler rather than adding to it, so that silently deleted the trap which restarts the stopped service - the one the script's own comment calls "the point", and the bug the role was written to eliminate. Every backup then stopped its service and left it stopped. It took forgejo, lnbits, headscale and memos down for several minutes each, and nothing caught it: the dumps exit 0, the artefacts are correct, the deploy reports failed=0, and liveness only proves the HOST is up. There is now ONE EXIT handler doing both jobs, armed BEFORE the stop so a failure during the stop still restarts. Verified by rendering both variants, asserting exactly one EXIT trap in each, and simulating a mid-way failure to confirm the restart fires. Verified: all 12 endpoints UP; six sources pulled cleanly (arbret 31M, headscale 198K, memos 7.8M, vaultwarden 2.1M, lnbits 30M, forgejo 2.6G), store 16% full, "RESULT: all checks passed". Known gaps, deliberately not closed here: * `yell` warnings - disk 75-90%, an artefact under half the previous size, retention not pruning - never reach Gatus, because a push is binary. * Nothing verifies a backed-up service came back UP. That is the gap that let the trap bug run unnoticed, and it is what the next change addresses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 09:22:12 +02:00
loop: "{{ store_sources }}"
- name: Register the backup endpoints
ansible.builtin.include_role:
name: gatus_endpoint
vars:
alerting: Signal via signal-cli-rest-api, and faster failure detection Three changes: detection windows tightened, a Signal transport deployed, and alerts attached to all 84 non-transport endpoints. ── Failing faster ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── The heartbeat is a TICKER, not a deadline: Gatus wakes every interval and asks "did anything arrive in the last interval", so real detection is 1-2x the window. And a window can only ever be as tight as the push frequency - which is why two checks moved rather than just having their numbers changed. liveness, cpu, ups, service-health, probes 16m -> 11m disk, zfs daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h backup store + pull job daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h DNS records 24h -> 6h backup dump 30h -> 26h backup-dump stays slow because the dump genuinely is daily. The store-side check catches the same fault within 6h by reading the source's dump timestamp out of the artefact filename, so 26h is a backstop rather than the primary signal. ── Thresholds differ by check type, deliberately ─────────────────────────── `failure-threshold` counts consecutive failures, but "consecutive" is a different amount of wall-clock time per check: a push endpoint produces one failure per heartbeat window, a pulled one per interval. The default of 3 would mean 33 minutes on an 11m heartbeat and over a day on a 7h one. More importantly the heartbeat window ALREADY encodes the tolerance - an 11m window on a 5-minute push is exactly "one missed push forgiven" - so stacking a threshold of 3 triples a tolerance that was already chosen. Hence: push/heartbeat endpoints failure-threshold 1 pulled, 5m (public) failure-threshold 3 (= 15 minutes) pulled, 6h/24h (dns, domain) failure-threshold 1 ── The Signal transport ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── roles/signal_api runs signal-cli-rest-api on the observability host, pinned by digest, MODE=native. It publishes NO PORTS. The API has no authentication of any kind - anything that reaches it can send messages as you and read your Signal. Gatus talks to it over a shared docker network by service name, which is also WHY the network exists: Gatus runs in a container, so the host's loopback is unreachable from it and a port published on 127.0.0.1 would not have worked. MODE=native and not json-rpc because this VPS has 464MB of RAM and already runs Gatus and Caddy. The json-rpc modes hold a resident JVM; native runs a binary per request, and alerts are rare enough that startup cost per alert is the right trade. Monitored - Gatus polls /v1/health over the same network path the alerts take, so it proves the delivery route rather than mere container liveness. Deliberately NOT backed up: the data directory holds Signal private keys and the recovery path is to link the device again from the phone. Neither the signal-api endpoint nor Gatus's self-check carries a Signal alert. If either is down, Signal is precisely what cannot deliver the alert. ── Four traps hit while linking, all now in the role README ──────────────── * /v1/qrcodelink is BROKEN in native mode - returns "no data to encode" while the binary itself emits a perfectly good URI. Not worked around by switching MODE, which would put a JVM in the path of every alert permanently. * The data dir must be owned by uid 1000, not root. A root-owned 0700 dir cannot be traversed by the container user, so linking silently never completes and /v1/accounts returns "Failed to read local accounts list". * `docker exec` runs as ROOT while the service runs as uid 1000, so without --config the account is written to /root/... on the container's ephemeral layer. It reports success and is destroyed on the next recreate. * The phone reporting "network error" was IPv6: chat.signal.org resolves to dualstack AAAA records first, the container has no IPv6 address, and this host's IPv6 path is broken - the same edge that 404'd the Go tarball. Fixed with a mounted gai.conf that prefers IPv4. Verified: provider loads (configuredProviders=[signal]), a test message was delivered and confirmed received, 84 endpoints carry alerts, 86 UP / 0 DOWN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 21:40:37 +02:00
# Push endpoints: the heartbeat window is the tolerance, so alert on
# the first failure rather than waiting for three 7h windows to pass.
gatus_endpoint_default_alerts:
- type: signal
failure-threshold: 1
success-threshold: 2
send-on-resolved: true
minimum-reminder-interval: 12h
backups: monitor both the dump and the pull, per source Twelve endpoints in two groups, because they answer different questions and fail for different reasons: backup-dump_<svc> pushed by the SOURCE right after its dump runs backup-store_<svc> pushed by the BOX at 05:30, per source backup-store_pull-job pushed by the BOX, about the box itself The store alone could catch almost everything, because the artefact filename carries the source's dump timestamp - a source whose timer died still pulls "ok" forever, but the timestamp gives it away. What the source side adds is LATENCY and DIAGNOSIS: the store only learns at the next 04:00 pull, and it cannot tell you whether the dump broke or the pull did. pull-job is separate from the per-source checks because it is a LEADING indicator where those are lagging ones. A disabled pull timer, a failed pull job, or a filling disk are all visible immediately, while the per-source checks only fire once an artefact is >26h stale - about a day later. Disable the timer at 10:00 and every source stays green until tomorrow; pull-job goes red this morning and names the cause instead of showing six stale sources. Frequencies: dumps 02:00-02:30 staggered, pull 04:00, verification 05:30, all daily and Persistent. 26h staleness decides red; a 30h Gatus heartbeat catches the verification itself having stopped, so a dead check-backups.timer cannot hide a stale backup. arbret has no dump endpoint: prd-arbret is in [arbret], which `managed` deliberately excludes, so nothing of ours runs there. Store-checked only. check-backups.sh was manual-only; it now runs on a timer and reports per source rather than only printing. The human-readable report is unchanged. A SERIOUS bug introduced and fixed in this change, recorded because the shape is easy to repeat: the reporting hook was added to backup.sh as a second `trap ... EXIT`. Bash REPLACES the EXIT handler rather than adding to it, so that silently deleted the trap which restarts the stopped service - the one the script's own comment calls "the point", and the bug the role was written to eliminate. Every backup then stopped its service and left it stopped. It took forgejo, lnbits, headscale and memos down for several minutes each, and nothing caught it: the dumps exit 0, the artefacts are correct, the deploy reports failed=0, and liveness only proves the HOST is up. There is now ONE EXIT handler doing both jobs, armed BEFORE the stop so a failure during the stop still restarts. Verified by rendering both variants, asserting exactly one EXIT trap in each, and simulating a mid-way failure to confirm the restart fires. Verified: all 12 endpoints UP; six sources pulled cleanly (arbret 31M, headscale 198K, memos 7.8M, vaultwarden 2.1M, lnbits 30M, forgejo 2.6G), store 16% full, "RESULT: all checks passed". Known gaps, deliberately not closed here: * `yell` warnings - disk 75-90%, an artefact under half the previous size, retention not pruning - never reach Gatus, because a push is binary. * Nothing verifies a backed-up service came back UP. That is the gap that let the trap bug run unnoticed, and it is what the next change addresses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 09:22:12 +02:00
gatus_endpoint_name: backups
gatus_endpoint_external: "{{ dump_endpoints + store_endpoints + [{
'name': 'pull job',
'group': 'backup-store',
'token': gatus_push_tokens['small_backups_local'],
alerting: Signal via signal-cli-rest-api, and faster failure detection Three changes: detection windows tightened, a Signal transport deployed, and alerts attached to all 84 non-transport endpoints. ── Failing faster ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── The heartbeat is a TICKER, not a deadline: Gatus wakes every interval and asks "did anything arrive in the last interval", so real detection is 1-2x the window. And a window can only ever be as tight as the push frequency - which is why two checks moved rather than just having their numbers changed. liveness, cpu, ups, service-health, probes 16m -> 11m disk, zfs daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h backup store + pull job daily/30h -> 6-hourly/7h DNS records 24h -> 6h backup dump 30h -> 26h backup-dump stays slow because the dump genuinely is daily. The store-side check catches the same fault within 6h by reading the source's dump timestamp out of the artefact filename, so 26h is a backstop rather than the primary signal. ── Thresholds differ by check type, deliberately ─────────────────────────── `failure-threshold` counts consecutive failures, but "consecutive" is a different amount of wall-clock time per check: a push endpoint produces one failure per heartbeat window, a pulled one per interval. The default of 3 would mean 33 minutes on an 11m heartbeat and over a day on a 7h one. More importantly the heartbeat window ALREADY encodes the tolerance - an 11m window on a 5-minute push is exactly "one missed push forgiven" - so stacking a threshold of 3 triples a tolerance that was already chosen. Hence: push/heartbeat endpoints failure-threshold 1 pulled, 5m (public) failure-threshold 3 (= 15 minutes) pulled, 6h/24h (dns, domain) failure-threshold 1 ── The Signal transport ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── roles/signal_api runs signal-cli-rest-api on the observability host, pinned by digest, MODE=native. It publishes NO PORTS. The API has no authentication of any kind - anything that reaches it can send messages as you and read your Signal. Gatus talks to it over a shared docker network by service name, which is also WHY the network exists: Gatus runs in a container, so the host's loopback is unreachable from it and a port published on 127.0.0.1 would not have worked. MODE=native and not json-rpc because this VPS has 464MB of RAM and already runs Gatus and Caddy. The json-rpc modes hold a resident JVM; native runs a binary per request, and alerts are rare enough that startup cost per alert is the right trade. Monitored - Gatus polls /v1/health over the same network path the alerts take, so it proves the delivery route rather than mere container liveness. Deliberately NOT backed up: the data directory holds Signal private keys and the recovery path is to link the device again from the phone. Neither the signal-api endpoint nor Gatus's self-check carries a Signal alert. If either is down, Signal is precisely what cannot deliver the alert. ── Four traps hit while linking, all now in the role README ──────────────── * /v1/qrcodelink is BROKEN in native mode - returns "no data to encode" while the binary itself emits a perfectly good URI. Not worked around by switching MODE, which would put a JVM in the path of every alert permanently. * The data dir must be owned by uid 1000, not root. A root-owned 0700 dir cannot be traversed by the container user, so linking silently never completes and /v1/accounts returns "Failed to read local accounts list". * `docker exec` runs as ROOT while the service runs as uid 1000, so without --config the account is written to /root/... on the container's ephemeral layer. It reports success and is destroyed on the next recreate. * The phone reporting "network error" was IPv6: chat.signal.org resolves to dualstack AAAA records first, the container has no IPv6 address, and this host's IPv6 path is broken - the same edge that 404'd the Go tarball. Fixed with a mounted gai.conf that prefers IPv4. Verified: provider loads (configuredProviders=[signal]), a test message was delivered and confirmed received, 84 endpoints carry alerts, 86 UP / 0 DOWN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 21:40:37 +02:00
'heartbeat': '7h'}] }}"